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At common law, a defendant's mistaken belief about the law was
no defense, even if that mistake resulted from reasonable reliance
on governmental advice. Thus, if a prosecutor or police officer
erroneously advised that certain conduct was legal, the
government was free to prosecute anyone following that advice.
In the mid-1950s, two separate legal doctrines altered the
common-law rule. First, the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code included a mistake of law defense; a version of this
defense was adopted in many states. A few years later, the
Supreme Court held that the Constitution prohibited conviction
in those circumstances; the Court cited neither the Model Penal
Code nor related criminal jurisprudence, instead relying solely
on due process principles. Now, in many states, two distinct
mistake of law defenses cover the same situation, one based on
the Constitution and another based on the Model Penal Code.
However, while the Model Penal Code defense never applies
when the constitutional defense does not, in many cases the
Model Penal Code allows conviction when the Constitution
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standing alone forbids it. For example, the Supreme Court has
granted the defense based on oral advice by government actors,
but the Model Penal Code, as enacted in several states, allows the
defense only for written advice. Similarly, the Supreme Court has
granted the defense for strict liability crimes, but some statutes
deny the defense in such cases. There is never a reason for a
defendant to raise the statutory defense; the constitutional defense
is better or at least as good in all cases. But many courts and
lawyers do not recognize that there are two defenses, one offering
less coverage than the other. As a result, many defendants are
convicted after their claims are rejected under a statute when they
might have been acquitted had they raised the argument directly
under the Constitution. Ironically, then, a law intended to protect
people from government deception has itself become a source of
government deception. This is unjust. Courts, counsel,
legislatures, and the American Law Institute should reconcile the
defenses, and ensure that cases are decided based on applicable
law rather than because of lawyers' or judges' mistakes about the
law.
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American law recognizes that a person should not be convicted if
she reasonably relies on official advice that the conduct at issue was
lawful. If the police advise protesters that they may picket in a
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particular place,' or if the Army Corps of Engineers advises a
business that it may dispose of waste in a particular way,2 the
government then should not be able to prosecute for that conduct,
even if the advice turns out to be incorrect.' This defense is called
"mistake of law";4 it is also sometimes referred to as "entrapment by
estoppel"' or the "reliance doctrine."6
The defense arose from, and is now embodied in, two distinct
sources. First, the Model Penal Code' recognized the defense in an
1. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559,571 (1965).
2. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 673-74 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Note, The Immunity-Conferring Power of the Office of Legal Counsel,
121 HARv. L. REV. 2086, 2092-93 (2008) (noting that the defense may be available to
government officials acting on the advice of the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of
Legal Counsel).
4. A number of sources offer general discussions of the defense, including its
rationale, justification and scope. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 5.6(e) (5th ed. 2010) (reviewing the basic features of the mistake of law defense); 2 PAUL
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 183 (1984) (discussing the mistake of law
defense generally); Sean Connelly, Bad Advice: The Entrapment by Estoppel Doctrine in
Criminal Law, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 627 (1994) (examining the origins and scope of the
defense); Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96
MICH. L. REV. 127 (1997) (critiquing the moral and philosophical bases for denying a
mistake of law defense); John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpretations of
the Law, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1997) (discussing the origins, rationale, and implications of
allowing the defense); Kenneth W. Simons, Ignorance and Mistake of Criminal Law,
Noncriminal Law, and Fact, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487 (2012) (examining the distinction
between a pure mistake of criminal law and a mistake of a noncriminal law that is relevant
to the elements of a crime); Note, Applying Estoppel Principles in Criminal Cases, 78
YALE L.J. 1046 (1969) (discussing the then-nascent constitutional mistake of law defense
in the context of the two early Supreme Court cases providing the defense, Raley v. Ohio,
360 U.S. 423 (1959), and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965)).
.5. United States v. George, 386 F.3d 383, 400 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2004). Some courts disfavor the term
entrapment by estoppel, reasoning that it is a due process defense, not entrapment. See
United States v. Brady, 710 F. Supp. 290, 295 (D. Colo. 1989). The defense has come to be
known as "entrapment by estoppel," although it is neither "entrapment," see Note, supra
note 4, at 1046-47, nor "an estoppel at all in any meaningful sense," Brady, 710 F. Supp. at
295. The Supreme Court has never used the term "entrapment by estoppel."
6. Commonwealth v. Cosentino, 850 A.2d 58,66 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
7. It provides:
(3) A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a
prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when:
(a) the statute or other enactment defining the offense is not known to the actor
and has not been published or otherwise reasonably made available prior to the
conduct alleged; or
(b) he acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward
determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (i) a statute or other
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influential and widely adopted provision.' In addition, the Supreme
Court recognized the defense as part of the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.9
Unfortunately, the Model Penal Code conceptualized the
defense as resting on public policy and legislative grace rather than
any binding command of the Constitution." Accordingly, the drafters
of the Model Penal Code and the state legislatures adopting it
believed that the defense could be structured, limited, or even
abolished as the states chose, like other parts of the Model Penal
Code." The Model Penal Code defense was not understood as a
statutory embodiment of the constitutional principle. In practice,
then, defendants who are misled by government advice are presented
with a choice of one or both of two distinct doctrines. They may
choose to invoke a statute that has restrictions and might make them
ineligible for the defense. Alternatively, they may choose the
constitutional principle that does not have those restrictions and thus
is more likely to grant them relief. Amazingly, as this Article shows,
defendants sometimes elect to plead the statute alone rather than the
Constitution, and as a result, they are convicted rather than acquitted.
This Article proposes that it is an error for the Model Penal
Code and the laws of the states to have a defense offering less
protection than the freestanding Constitution. A defendant gains
nothing by raising a defense based on the statute; the constitutional
defense is always as good or better. Ironically, the Model Penal
enactment; (ii) a judicial decision, opinion or judgment; (iii) an administrative
order or grant of permission; or (iv) an official interpretation of the public officer
or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or
enforcement of the law defining the offense.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (1962). Section 2.04, in common with general principles of
criminal law, also makes mistake of law a defense in two other circumstances:
(1) Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if:
(a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief,
recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense;
or
(b) the law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or
mistake constitutes a defense.
Id.
8. See infra notes 113-15.
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. See infra Part I.B.
11. It is a "Model," rather than "Uniform," code.
[Vol. 93142
MISTAKE OF LAW AND THE MPC
Code's mistake of law defense, designed to prevent unfair convictions
based on misleading governmental advice, actually generates unfair
convictions because the defense itself constitutes misleading
governmental advice, inducing defendants to forego a defense that
might work in favor of one that will not.
Part I of this Article discusses the development of the mistake of
law defense in the United States. 2 In the early twentieth century,
some courts and legislatures recognized the unfairness of imprisoning
people for following government advice, while other jurisdictions
insisted that ignorance of the law was no excuse, even if that
ignorance was induced by good-faith reliance on government advice.
By midcentury, both the Supreme Court and influential law
reformers concluded that the arguments in favor of a mistake of law
defense had prevailed, but the Court and the American Law Institute
("ALI") created the defense in very different ways. Supreme Court
cases held that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibited government actors from advising people that
particular conduct was permissible and then prosecuting them for it.'3
When recognizing what this Article will call the "constitutional
defense," the "constitutional mistake of law defense," or "entrapment
by estoppel," the Court's opinions make clear that the defense was
grounded in the principles of fairness embodied in the Constitution;
little or no attention was paid to criminal law concerns per se, such as
whether the defendant had a particular mens rea or whether the
advice negated some element of the offense.
The ALI also concluded that the Model Penal Code should
contain such a defense from the beginning of the drafting process in
the mid-1950s.14 However, what this Article will call the "Model Penal
Code defense" or the "Model Penal Code mistake of law defense,"
rested on principles of criminal law and public policy. Indeed, Model
Penal Code section 2.04 was initially drafted before the Supreme
Court recognized the constitutional basis of the principle, so it could
not have been meant to incorporate a constitutional requirement.
Although they arose independently, the Model Penal Code
defense and the constitutional defense address precisely the same
problem: whether a defendant can be convicted of a crime after the
government told him that the conduct was lawful and permissible.
Although addressing the same issue, as Part II explains, the Model
12. See infra Part 1.
13. See infra Part IA.
14. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
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Penal Code, particularly as adopted in the states, denies relief in
many circumstances where the constitutional defense would grant it."
Part III proposes a resolution of the problem of having a narrow
statute coexisting with a broader constitutional provision.16 Perhaps
the Model Penal Code-based statutes represent a failed effort to
codify the constitutional mistake of law defense. Alternatively,
perhaps the statutes are obsolete, once having served the useful
purpose of recognizing the mistake of law defense but now having
been superseded by a more capacious understanding of due process
of law as embodied in the constitutional defense. In either event, the
Model Penal Code-based statutes do much harm and little good by
inducing defendants to invoke a defense that will not work instead of
one that will or might. Model Penal Code section 2.04 and its state
law enactments should be amended to eliminate their misleading
character, and they should be construed by courts to be at least as
broad as the constitutional defense recognized by the Supreme Court.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MISTAKE OF LAW DEFENSES
At common law, both historically and today, a personal
misunderstanding or ignorance of the law is generally not a defense to
a criminal prosecution;" this is reflected in the familiar maxim
"ignorance of the law is no excuse."' 8 The ignorance principle arose
when most crimes involved clear moral wrongdoing, such as rape,
robbery, and murder; people committing such acts could rarely claim
that they thought their conduct to be legitimate." Applying this
principle rigidly, until the mid-twentieth century, many courts held
that ignorance of the law was no defense, even when a person
reasonably relied on a government official's advice.20
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.6 (2d ed. 2003).
18. Id.
19. See Parry, supra note 4, at 24; Note, supra note 4, at 1060-63.
20. See, e.g., Broadfoot v. State, 182 So. 411, 412 (Ala. Ct. App. 1938) (holding that
reliance on the opinions of a state attorney general is no defense); Lindquist v. State, 213
S.W.2d 895, 896 (Ark. 1948) (affirming a fine notwithstanding reliance on attorney general
opinions); Hopkins v. State, 69 A.2d 456, 460 (Md. 1949) (holding that reliance on the
opinion of a prosecutor is no defense), appeal dismissed per curiam, 339 U.S. 940 (1950);
State v. Foster, 46 A. 833, 834-35 (R.I. 1900) (holding that the advice of the state treasurer
that a licensing provision was inapplicable is no defense). See generally Livingston Hall &
Selig J. Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 641 (1940) (discussing
the history and modern justifications of the mistake of law defense and its relationship
with moral culpability); R.H.S., Annotation, Reliance upon Advice of Counsel as Affecting
Criminal Responsibility, 133 A.L.R. 1055 (1941) (discussing some cases involving advice
144 [Vol. 93
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However, over time, strict adherence to the ignorance maxim
came to seem unjust in some circumstances.2 ' Particularly in
regulatory areas or other complex branches of law where even
scrupulous people acting in good faith found it difficult to avoid
occasional mistakes, courts found it unfair to impose criminal liability
when a defendant reasonably relied on government advice.22 The
decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri in State v. White3
illustrates the principle. When discharging White from prison, the
warden handed him pardon papers and told him, "[n]ow go home and
be a good citizen." 24 White presented those papers to election
officials, who told him he could vote.25 He was convicted of voting
illegally. 26 Although under the law White's right to vote had not
actually been restored, the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed,
explaining:
While it is true that everybody is supposed to know the law, it is
nevertheless a fact that the most trained judicial minds often
have great difficulty in determining what the law is on a given
subject. . .. [I]t would be a harsh rule to say that he can be
convicted of a felony, because these election officers were
mistaken and gave him improper advice.27
Congress also recognized that it was unfair to convict people for
violating complicated laws when they relied on official advice in good
faith. Accordingly, it relaxed the ignorance maxim in New Deal
from government officials); G.S.G., Annotation, Reliance on Judicial Decision as Defense
to Prosecution, 49 A.L.R. 1273 (1927) (discussing cases addressing the effect of a change in
judicial decision on the rights of a defendant).
21. Bruce R. Grace, Note, Ignorance of the Law As an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
1392, 1392 (1986) (arguing that "[ft]he principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse, long
thought to be basic to criminal law, is no longer appropriate when criminal law applies in
surprising ways to otherwise ordinary behavior").
22. See, e.g., People v. Ferguson, 24 P.2d 965, 970 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1933) (reversing
conviction where corporation commission officials mistakenly advised the defendant that
he could sell certain securities); State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, 156 So. 705, 709 (Fla.
1934) (holding no liability for malum prohibitum offenses made in reliance on judicial
opinions); State v. Pearson, 97 N.C. 434, 436-37, 1 S.E. 914, 915-16 (1887) (vacating
conviction where election officials mistakenly allowed a convicted felon to vote); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 cmt. 3 at 139 (Tentative Draft No. 4 1955) (collecting cases
upholding entrapment by estoppel defense); Parry, supra note 4, at 8.
23. 140 S.W. 896 (Mo. 1911).





146 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93
regulatory statutes. 8 For example, the Securities Act of 1933
provided that "[njo provision of this subchapter imposing any liability
shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with
any rule or regulation of the Commission .. . ."29 The Supreme Court
extended this principle to tax cases, holding, for example, that a
criminal tax conviction requires an intentional violation of a known
legal duty; a person who pays no tax and files no return is not guilty if
she did not know of the legal obligation to do so.'
There are powerful reasons for allowing a defense when a person
reasonably relies on government advice. As Professor John T. Parry
explained, the reasons for the general rule that ignorance of the law is
no excuse do not apply when a person follows official advice.'
Justifications for limiting the defense of personal mistake of law
include problems of judicial competence to evaluate claims of
ignorance,3 2 the value of societal education about the law," and the
idea that laws have some objective meaning." However, Parry argued
that these justifications do not apply to a mistake of law defense
founded on official advice." The defense does not impose upon
judges the difficult task of determining whether a defendant was
actually ignorant of the law; the focus is on the government's
28. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 cmt. 3 at 139 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955)
(noting history).
29. Securities Act of 1933 § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2012); see also Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37(c) (2012) ("No provision of this subchapter imposing
any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any
rule, regulation, or order of the Commission, notwithstanding that such rule, regulation, or
order may, after such act or omission, b[e] amended or rescinded or be determined by
judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.").
30. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394-96 (1933), overruled in part on other
grounds, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), abrogated by United States
v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 (1998); see also Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141-42
(1994) (holding that federal reporting requirements for banks require knowledge of
unlawfulness).
31. Parry, supra note 4, at 66.
32. Id. at 67. The judicial competence approach holds that "the maxim exists because
it is too difficult for courts to evaluate claims of ignorance." Id.
33. Id. The societal education argument posits that " 'to admit the excuse at all would
be to encourage ignorance where the law-maker has determined to make men know and
obey.'" Id. (quoting OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 48 (Boston, Little,
Brown & Co. 1881)).
34. See id. at 68. Lastly, the objective-meaning principle recognizes that it is
"'possible to disagree indefinitely regarding the meaning of [those] words.' But 'the
debate must end' at some point and legal rules must have an objective meaning." Id.
(quoting JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 382 (2d ed. 1960)).
35. Parry, supra note 4, at 66.
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statement and the defendant's objectively reasonable reliance.3 6
Further, rejecting the defense may encourage ignorance of the law
because the availability of a defense incentivizes people to inquire
about the permissibility of their conduct. Also, presumably, the
normal way that people obtain official advice is by asking government
officials for instructions, which is conduct to be encouraged.3 7
These developments reflected a general consensus that it was
unfair to impose liability based on misleading official advice. But, the
idea had not turned into a constitutional principle. Rather, it was
regarded as a policy question upon which jurisdictions and particular
legal regimes could, and did, differ. Then, in the 1950s, two distinct
general solutions arose: the U.S. Supreme Court created a defense
based on the Constitution, and the ALI created a defense in the
Model Penal Code.
A. Mistake of Law As a Constitutional Defense
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized mistake of law as a
defense" in Raley v. Ohio,9 a 1959 decision that was unanimous on
36. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) (1962) (stating that the mistake of law defense
is available when one "acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law").
Research has uncovered no cases on the issue, but if a defendant knows that the
governmental advice is wrong, the defense should not be available.
37. Although not often discussed by courts or commentators, there is another reason,
beyond fairness in a particular case, that the government should not be able to advise
people that conduct is permitted or required by law and then prosecute them for it: it
would create the risk of oppression and tyranny. If government inducement to do things
that were illegal or not to do things that were required by law were irrelevant, then a
corrupt government would have a powerful tool to imprison disfavored individuals or
members of disfavored groups.
38. The issue was raised in an earlier case, Hopkins v. State, 69 A.2d 456 (Md. 1949),
appeal dismissed per curiam, 339 U.S. 940 (1950). In Hopkins, the Maryland Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction of a minister for advertising his availability to perform
weddings over a claim that he had a right to advertise grounded in the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment. 69 A.2d at 459-60. Hopkins also claimed that the local
prosecutor had advised him that the advertising sign did not violate the statute, but the
Maryland court held that "advice given by a public official, even a State's Attorney, that a
contemplated act is not criminal will not excuse an offender if, as a matter of law, the act
performed did amount to a violation of the law." Id. at 460. For some reason, Hopkins'
jurisdictional statement in his appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court focused exclusively on
the free exercise claim, omitting the mistake of law argument. See Statement as to
Jurisdiction at 2-3, Hopkins v. Maryland, 339 U.S. 940 (1950) (No. 49-727). Accordingly,
while the Court's summary disposition is a holding on the merits of the issues presented, it
does not represent an expression of the Court's views on the entrapment by estoppel
question. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam) (noting that
"dismissals for want of a substantial federal question without doubt reject the specific
challenges presented in the statement of jurisdiction and do leave undisturbed the
judgment appealed from"). Reverend Hopkins almost certainly would have First
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the point.4 Relying on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court held that "convicting a citizen for exercising a
privilege which the State clearly had told him was available to him" is
"to sanction the most indefensible sort of entrapment by the State."4 1
In Raley, the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission 42 held a
hearing to investigate the "suspicious activities" of four people who
were subpoenaed as witnesses.43 The Commission Chair began by
explaining: "I should like to advise you under the Fifth Amendment,
you are permitted to refuse to answer questions that might tend to
incriminate you.... But you are not permitted to refuse to answer
questions simply for your own convenience."" The witnesses then
declined to answer questions.45 As a result, the witnesses were
convicted of failing to answer particular questions.46
Amendment protection now for his commercial speech. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (upholding a lawyer's right to advertise representation in
divorces); European Connections & Tours, Inc. v. Gonzales, 480 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1370
(N.D. Ga. 2007) (upholding disclosure requirements under the International Marriage
Broker Regulation Act, noting that "[n]owhere in the IMBRA statute are there any
provisions attempting to regulate the content of IMBs' commercial messages in which they
tout their respective services in an attempt to induce commercial transactions").
39. 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
40. Justice Potter Stewart did not participate, id. at 442, presumably because his
father, Ohio Supreme Court Judge James Garfield Stewart, dissented below. The eight
participating U.S. Supreme Court justices ostentatiously adopted its rationale. See id. at
426 (agreeing with pertinent "part of Judge Stewart's .dissenting opinion in the Ohio
Supreme Court"); id. at 442 (Clark J., concurring in pertinent part) ("Like our
Brethren ... we, too, agree with Judge Stewart of Ohio's Supreme Court."). Justice
Stewart agreed with his father, joining the majority in the later cases applying the doctrine.
See United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 673-75 (1973); United States v.
Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 487 (1967); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965).
41. Raley, 360 U.S. at 438.
42. The Ohio Un-American Activities Commission was established by the Ohio
General Assembly "to investigate subversive activities." State v. Morgan, 133 N.E.2d 104,
110 (Ohio 1956), vacated, 354 U.S. 929 (1957), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Raley v.
Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959). The Commission was comprised entirely of members of the
General Assembly and had the power to prosecute individuals for contempt. Id.
43. See Raley, 360 U.S. at 424 n.1. One of the four individuals was suspected of
participating in communist activities. Id. at 426. The other three were questioned about
"subversive activities in the labor movement." Id. at 428.
44. Id. at 426-27. The chairman also advised the witnesses of Ohio's analogous state
constitutional right against self-incrimination. Id. at 425.
. 45. See id. at 426-28. The witnesses refused to answer questions that arguably were
not incriminating. One witness refused to answer simple questions, such as his address. Id.
at 428. In response, Commission counsel asked "Is there something about the nature or
character of the home in which you live that to admit you live there would make you
subject to criminal prosecution?" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Only once did
the Commission reject the witness's Fifth Amendment assertion. Id. at 429. In most
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The prosecution's theory at trial was that, although the privilege
might be available in general, it could not be used as a basis to decline
to answer specific questions, the answers to which were clearly not
incriminating.4 7 The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but
on a different ground. The court discovered and relied on an Ohio
statute immunizing witnesses testifying before legislative
committees.4 Because of the statute, although the defendants did not
realize it, they could not have been prosecuted based on their
testimony.49 As the witnesses in fact faced no risk of prosecution, they
could not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Ohio Commission had
never mentioned the statute to the witnesses; to the contrary, it
expressly stated that the privilege could be invoked."o Therefore the
Court concluded that even though the privilege not to self-incriminate
was not legally available because immunity removed the risk of
prosecution, the defendants had no reason to know that legal
nuance."1 Accordingly, the defendants could not be convicted for
relying on governmental advice that the privilege was available. 52
The Supreme Court applied the defense again in Cox v.
Louisiana." Defendant B. Elton CoX5 4 organized a protest at a
instances, after the witness asserted his or her Fifth Amendment privilege, the
Commission moved on to the next question. Id.
46. Id. at 424.
47. Id. at 432.
48. State v. Morgan, 133 N.E.2d 104, 115 (Ohio 1956), vacated, 354 U.S. 929 (1957),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959). The statute
provided that:
[TJhe testimony of a witness examined before a committee or sub-committee shall
not be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding against such witness, nor shall a
person be prosecuted or subjected to a penalty or forfeiture on account of a
transaction, matter, or thing, concerning which he testifies, or produces evidence.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 101.44 (West 1953) (emphasis added).
49. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the statute applied although the privilege did
not protect against federal prosecution. Raley, 360 U.S. at 431-34.
50. Id. at 431-32 ("For reasons unexplained,... the Commission's actions were totally
inconsistent with a view on its part that the privilege against self-incrimination was not
available. The Commission thought the privilege available, and it gave positive advice that
it could be used.").
51. Id. at 441-42.
52. Id. at 425-26.
53. 379 U.S. 559, 572 (1965).
54. See generally Benjamin Elton Cox Biography, FREEDOM RIDERS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/freedomriders/people/benjamin-elton-cox
(last visited Aug. 20, 2014) (stating that Reverend Cox was a well-known civil rights leader
who was one of the first Freedom Riders).
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courthouse where twenty-three students were held after being
arrested for picketing racially segregated lunch counters." As the
group approached the courthouse, the Chief of Police told Cox that
the protesters had to stay on the west side of the street, 101 feet from
the courthouse.5 6 Cox complied, but, after Cox's statements offended
the Chief, the Chief ordered the protesters to disband.57 The
protestors initially refused to leave but departed after being tear
gassed." Cox was convicted of various crimes, and the Louisiana
Supreme Court affirmed." One offense was picketing "near" a
courthouse with the intent to influence a public official or jury; the
critical question was whether he could be convicted of being too
"near" based on being in a place where the police told him to be.'
The Supreme Court, applying Raley, held that "[t]he Due
Process Clause does not permit convictions to be obtained under such
circumstances."6 1 Cox was "justified in his continued belief that
because of the original official grant of permission he had a right to
stay where he was."62 Although the permission had been withdrawn,
it was for a reason inconsistent with the First Amendment, and
therefore Cox was justified in continuing the protest.6 3
In United States v. Laub,' the Court again found that a person
could not be convicted for actions performed in reliance on
government advice.' A unanimous Court held that a defendant could
not be prosecuted for conspiracy based on a plan to go to Cuba with a
U.S. passport not validated for travel to Cuba.66 The State
Department had consistently explained that individuals travelling to a
country where a U.S. passport was not valid would be without
diplomatic protection, but never suggested that travelers would be
55. Cox v. Louisiana (Cox 1), 379 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1965).
56. Id. at 541.
57. Id. at 543.
58. Id. at 543-44.
59. Cox v. Louisiana (Cox II), 379 U.S. 559, 560 (1965).
60. Id. The Court suggested that it might have upheld the conviction had the police
chief denied the right to protest in the first instance. Id. at 571-72 ("This is not to say that
had the appellant, entirely on his own, held the demonstration across the street from the
courthouse... and... had he defied an order of the police requiring him to hold this
demonstration at some point further away ... we would reverse the conviction as in this
case.").
61. Id. at 571.
62. Id. at 572.
63. Id.
64. 385 U.S. 475 (1967).
65. Id. at 487.
66. Id. at 482-85.
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guilty of a crime: "Ordinarily, citizens may not be punished for
actions undertaken in good faith reliance upon authoritative
assurance that punishment will not attach. As this Court said in
Raley ... we may not convict 'a citizen for exercising a privilege which
the State clearly had told him was available . .. .' "1
There is an arguable limitation to the scope of Raley, Cox, and
Laub. While the cases were not decided on the basis that independent
constitutional rights were at stake, therefore requiring a greater
degree of scrutiny, these cases arguably implicated constitutional
rights. Raley implicated the privilege against self-incrimination, Cox
involved freedom of speech, assembly, and equal protection of the
law, and Laub affected the right to travel. Accordingly, based on just
these cases, there might be an argument that a constitutional mistake
of law defense is inapplicable in a criminal case where independent
constitutional rights are not involved."8
However, the Court's most recent case makes clear that the
principle is not limited to prosecutions implicating specific
constitutional rights. In United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial
Chemical Corp.69 ("PICCO"), the Court reaffirmed the right to rely
on official advice in an ordinary commercial case."o Defendant
PICCO was convicted under section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899 for dumping industrial refuse into the Monongahela River.'
Section 13 prohibited dumping in navigable waters.72 The Army
Corps of Engineers, responsible for administering the Act, had
consistently interpreted section 13 to apply only to discharges that
impeded or obstructed navigation," but the Department of Justice
brought criminal charges for a discharge without alleging that it
67. Id. at 487 (quoting Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423,438 (1959)).
68. See Parry, supra note 4, at 41 n.1 60; Note, supra note 3, at 2095-96.
69. 411 U.S. 655 (1973).
70. Id. at 673-75.
71. Id. at 658. That section provides:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit,... either from or out of any
ship, barge, or other floating craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf,
manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or
description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the United States, or into
any tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed
into such navigable water.
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2012)).
72. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act § 13.
73. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 672 (1973).
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impeded navigation.74 The question was whether PICCO was entitled
to rely on the interpretations of the Army Corps of Engineers."
The Court noted that there was no question that the advice of
the Corps of Engineers was wrong and therefore that PICCO violated
the law by dumping, even if navigation was unaffected." The Court
explained that section 13 in fact applies to water deposits that have no
tendency to affect navigation; based on recent Supreme Court and
lower court cases, "[section] 13 is to be read ... as imposing a flat ban
on the unauthorized deposit of foreign substances into navigable
waters."n
Thus, as is typical in such cases, the question was not the rights of
the parties going forward; the defendant's conduct clearly violated the
law. Instead, the question was whether PICCO could be criminally
punished for actions that were in fact illegal but that occurred during
the period when "the Army Corps of Engineers consistently
construed [section] 13" as inapplicable to the charged conduct."
The Court applied Raley and Cox," holding that "to the extent
that the regulations deprived PICCO of fair warning as to what
conduct the Government intended to make criminal, we think there
can be no doubt that traditional notions of fairness inherent in our
system of criminal justice prevent the Government from proceeding
with the prosecution."" Accordingly, the Court held that "it was error
for the [d]istrict [c]ourt to refuse to permit PICCO to present
evidence . .. that it had been affirmatively misled into believing that
the discharges in question were not a violation of the statute."'
The power of the defense is underscored by the fact that there
was a reasonable argument that PICCO's position was clearly
incorrect even at the time of the offense, based on existing Supreme
Court decisions and the regulations as a whole.82 Justices Blackmun
and Rehnquist, while not questioning the applicability of the defense
in principle, would have held it unavailable to PICCO for that
reason." Something quite similar, though, can be said about Raley;
74. Id. at 658.
75. Id. at 657.
76. Id. at 670-71.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 672.
79. Id. at 674.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 675.
82. Id. at 674-75.
83. Id. at 675-76 (Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
152 [Vol. 93
MISTAKE OF LAW AND THE MPC
because the immunity statute was there for anyone who cared to read
it, the government's advice that witnesses could invoke their privilege
against self-incrimination was clearly wrong.' Raley and PICCO
suggest, then, that reliance on official advice may be reasonable even
if, after researching the question, a lawyer could have definitively
determined that the governmental advice was wrong. Put another
way, the decisions imply that private citizens are not expected to
know more about the law than government officials.
Raley and its progeny developed constitutional principles, not
criminal law principles, in several senses. First, neither the Court nor
the parties emphasized criminal law jurisprudence.' The Court did
not rest the outcome on common law, statutes, or scholarly
authorities dealing with mistake of law. Instead, the critical issues
were fairness, notice, and due process. Relatedly, the decision was not
based on negation of an essential element of an offense at issue. 86
PICCO did not actually cite the Due Process Clause, but it cited
Raley and Cox" and has universally been understood as resting on
due process principles.'
Relying on Raley, Cox, Laub, and PICCO, lower courts have
continued to elaborate the entrapment by estoppel defense. While the
precise formulations differ, most courts require the following:
84. The difference might be that PICCO might have had access to a lawyer to
investigate questions like this. Therefore, it is even more telling that the Court allowed the
possibility of a defense.
85. Cf People v. Woods, 616 N.W.2d 211, 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) ("The due
process principle underlying the doctrine of entrapment by estoppel is fairness to a well-
intentioned citizen who unwittingly breaks the law while relying on government agents'
statements under circumstances where reliance is reasonable.").
86. The Court could not have decided the case on that basis, because Raley and Cox
were state cases, and the state courts, which have the last word on the meaning of state
laws did not find that, say, knowledge of illegality was an essential element of the offense
that was negated by the mistaken advice. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157,
163 (1943) (noting that state courts are the "final arbiters" of state criminal law). Instead,
the defense was based on an assumption that every element of the offense had been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See generally, e.g., PICCO, 411 U.S. 655 (allowing
PICCO to raise the affirmative defense).
87. PICCO, 411 U.S. at 674.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Austin, 915 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1990); Lerner v. Gill, 751 F.2d 450, 457 n.6 (1st Cir.
1985); United States v. Carroll, 320 F. Supp. 2d 748, 758 (S.D. Ill. 2004); United States v.
Conley, 859 F. Supp. 909, 921 (W.D. Pa. 1994); United States v. Brady, 710 F. Supp. 290,
294 (D. Colo. 1989); Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 764 A.2d 20, 27-28 (Pa. 2001); Joshua I.
Schwartz, The Irresistible Force Meets the Immovable Object: Estoppel Remedies for an
Agency's Violation of Its Own Regulations or Other Misconduct, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 653,
736 (1992).
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[Tlhat (1) a government official (2) told the defendant that
certain criminal conduct was legal, (3) the defendant actually
relied on the government official's statements, (4) and the
defendant's reliance was in good faith and reasonable in light of
the identity of the government official, the point of law
represented, and the substance of the official's statement."
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated: "In harmony with the
United States Supreme Court's approach to due process challenges,
and considering the impossibility of identifying all forms of conduct
and practices that may implicate protection, we recognize that such
requirements should not be applied rigidly as against a defendant
whose claims clearly implicate fundamental fairness."' Courts differ
on who bears the burden of persuasion," but many federal courts
hold that the defendant must prove each element.92
The constitutional defense is distinct from several related
doctrines.9 3 First, although sometimes called entrapment by estoppel,
it is not a true estoppel, because once a defendant is disabused of her
mistake, she must thereafter comply with the law.94 A typical case for
89. United States v. W. Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 313 (3d Cir. 1997). The
Second and Tenth Circuits define entrapment by estoppel in the same manner. See United
States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Nichols, 21 F.3d 1016, 1018
(10th Cir. 1994). The First and Sixth Circuits define entrapment by estoppel slightly
differently: "(1) a government must have announced that the charged criminal act was
legal; (2) the defendant relied on the government announcement; (3) the defendant's
reliance was reasonable; and, (4) given the defendant's reliance, the prosecution would be
unfair." United States v. Ormsby, 252 F.3d 844, 851 n.7 (6th Cir. 2001); see United States v.
Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 715 (1st Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit uses another formulation:
In order to establish entrapment by estoppel, a defendant must show that (1) "an
authorized government official," "empowered to render the claimed erroneous
advice," (2) "who has been made aware of all the relevant historical facts," (3)
"affirmatively told him the proscribed conduct was permissible," (4) that "he
relied on the false information," and (5) "that his reliance was reasonable."
United States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
90. Kratsas, 764 A.2d at 33.
91. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 837 N.W.2d 81, 90 (Neb. 2013) (holding that the state
must disprove defense beyond a reasonable doubt).
92. Batterjee, 361 F.3d at 1216; United States v. Benning, 248 F.3d 772, 775 (8th Cir.
2001); Abcasis, 45 F.3d at 44; Austin, 915 F.2d at 365.
93. Daniel E. Monnat & Paige A. Nichols, How to Free a 'Guilty' Client by Arguing
Entrapment by Estoppel, THE CHAMPION, Dec. 2010, at 30, 31 (discussing the relationship
to related defenses).
94. In Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990), Justice White's
concurring opinion distinguished PICCO from a claim for affirmative monetary relief
against the United States: "In PICCO, the courts were asked to prevent the Government
from exercising its lawful discretionary authority in a particular case whereas here the
MISTAKE OF LAW AND THE MPC
application of the doctrine is when a probationer is mistakenly told
she may possess a firearm, when in fact a criminal statute prohibits
her from doing so. Entrapment by estoppel (or the constitutional
defense, mistake of law), if applied, prevents her conviction for being
a felon in possession of a firearm. A true estoppel would not only
provide a defense for possession of the firearm, but would allow her
to continue to possess the firearm even after learning of the mistake."
Second, entrapment, like the constitutional mistake of law
defense, involves government inducement. But with true entrapment,
the government induces the defendant's conduct, not necessarily a
belief that the conduct is legal. 6 In true entrapment cases, the
defendant need not be under the impression that the conduct is lawful
or that the encouragement comes from the government.9 7
Third, the public-authority defense benefits private persons who
commit crimes while working for the government (say, by purchasing
or selling drugs in order to facilitate a prosecution). 8 However, the
constitutional defense allows reliance on mere advice that conduct is
lawful, and therefore it "does not require the government to have
actually asked the defendant to engage in the prohibited conduct."'
The constitutional defense is also distinct from the fact that
knowledge that conduct is illegal is sometimes made an element of a
criminal offense." In such cases, a defendant's belief that conduct is
courts have been asked to require the Executive Branch to violate a congressional
statute." 496 U.S. at 434-35 (White, J., concurring).
95. See, e.g., In re Lyon, 882 A.2d 1143, 1145 (Vt. 2005) ("[W]e hold that the Board
erred in rejecting the Lyons' estoppel argument and that the State is estopped from
revoking the Lyons' wastewater permit.").
96. " 'Entrapment by estoppel" has little to do with the affirmative defense of
entrapment, under which a person induced by public officials to commit a crime can be
convicted only if he was predisposed to commit that offense independent of the
inducement." Kimani v. Holder, 695 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2012).
97. Gabriel J. Chin, The Story of Jacobson: Catching Criminals or Creating Crime, in
CRIMINAL LAW STORIES 299,304 (Donna Coker & Robert Weisberg eds., 2013).
98. United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1368 n.18 (11th Cir. 1994); see
United States v. Jumah, 493 F.3d 868, 874 & n.4 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Burt, 410
F.3d 1100, 1104 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005).
99. United States v. Fulcher, 188 F. Supp. 2d 627, 642 (W.D. Va. 2002) (citing 53 AM.
JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 20 (1999)).
100. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text; see People v. Weiss, 12 N.E.2d 514,
515-16 (N.Y. 1938) (holding that a mistake of law could negate element of offense where
statute provided that an action was criminal only if done "without authority of law"). A
belief that property has been abandoned may be a defense to a charge of larceny or
damage. See People v. Goodin, 69 P. 85, 86 (Cal. 1902); see also MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.04(1) (1962) (providing that ignorance or mistake of fact or law is a defense if it
negates an element of the statute, or if the statute provides that ignorance or mistake
constitutes a defense).
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legal precludes conviction."o' This variety of mistake of law differs
from the entrapment by estoppel variety in two ways. First, it is not a
true defense; it represents a failure of proof of an essential element of
the offense.'02 Second, it normally does not matter how or why the
mistake is made; a personal mistake or a mistake induced by a private
actor has the same consequence as a mistake induced by the
government.
Another conceptually related defense is the "void for vagueness"
doctrine, which deems a statute unenforceable if it "fails to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated
conduct is forbidden."' But this doctrine is based on the language of
a statute itself, not governmental advice about it. Also, for
entrapment by estoppel to apply, the advice must be reasonably clear,
and the crux of the void for vagueness doctrine is that the law's
command is mysterious. 'I
Lambert v. California"os may be another distant cousin of the
constitutional defense because it also provides a defense when the
defendant does not understand the actual state of the law. In
Lambert, the Supreme Court held that due process sometimes
precludes punishment of innocent omissions when the defendant is
not actually aware of the duty to act.'06 In Lambert, the constitutional
defect is lack of notice of the law, not a belief that the conduct is legal.
In mistake of law defenses, the defendant will normally have had
some inkling of the possibility that the conduct might be criminal;
otherwise, they would not have sought government advice to clarify
the scope of their duties.
B. Mistake of Law As a Model Penal Code Defense
The drafters of the Model Penal Code developed a mistake of
law defense based on criminal law principles, independently of the
Raley line of constitutional cases. In the mid-twentieth century, law
101. ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 62(b).
102. Jumah, 493 F.3d at 873-74.
103. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (quoting United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)); see, e.g., Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d
1006, 1019 (9th Cir. 2013) ("We conclude that the phrase 'in violation of a criminal
offense' is unintelligible and therefore the statute is void for vagueness.").
104. Perhaps, though, reliance on official advice about a vague or unclear statutory
command is more likely to be reasonable.
105. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
106. Id. at 229-30; see, e.g., Garrison v. State, 950 So. 2d 990, 993-94 (Miss. 2006); Wolf
v. State, 292 P.3d 512, 517-18 (Okla. Crim. App. 2012).
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reformers turned individual cases and statutes recognizing mistake of
law in particular circumstances into a general principle. Following the
suggestion of the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Law ("National Commission"), the ALI concluded that "[i]t
is difficult .. . to see how any purpose can be served by a conviction"
if the defendant violated the law after relying on the advice of a
government official."' The National Commission recognized that a
person who, in good faith, relies on erroneous advice
is not culpable, within the framework of a system of definite
positive laws. He has done all that can reasonably be expected
to conform his conduct to the law. There is no room for
deterrence in such circumstances without either imposing on
persons an unreasonable burden to study the law, or, in effect,
limiting their conduct more broadly than the criminal law
intends.os
The ALI created this defense in Model Penal Code section 2.04,
which was introduced in the 1955 Tentative Draft." Although four
years later the U.S. Supreme Court established the due process
defense in Raley v. Ohio,"o the ALI did not subsequently amend
section 2.04, which remained nearly identical in the 1962 final
version. t ' The 1955 draft of section 2.04 was based on Louisiana's
mistake of law statute as well as the implications of federal statutes
and earlier judicial decisions.112
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 cmt. 3 at 138 (Tentative Draft No. 4,1955).
108. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Comment on Basis of Criminal Liability; Culpability;
Causation: Chapter 3; Section 610, in WORKING PAPERS OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON
REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS 105, 139 (1970).
109. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 at 17-18 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
110. 360 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1959).
111. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (1962). The 1955 draft provided:
(3) A reasonable belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a
defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct, when: ... (b)
[the defendant] acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law,
afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (i) a statute or other
enactment; (ii) a judicial decision, opinion or judgment; (iii) an administrative
order or grant of permission; or (iv) an official interpretation of the public officer
or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or
enforcement of the law defining the offense.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 at 17-18 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955). For the nearly
identical text of section 2.04 in the 1962 version, see supra note 7.
112. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 cmt. 3 at 138-39 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
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The Model Penal Code has been influential. Nine states adopted
section 2.04 or a nearly identical provision; 13 nine others enacted a
modified version.' 14 Iowa has a statute applicable only when the
mistake negates an element of the offense."' An additional twenty
states"' and the District of Columbia"' recognized the mistake of law
defense in judicial opinions. Ten states"' have apparently neither
enacted the Model Penal Code nor considered .the defense in a
judicial decision. The state statutes differing from the Model Penal
113. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-206 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-6 (West
2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-220 (1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.070 (LexisNexis
2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 36 (2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.031 (West
2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-4 (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20 (McKinney 2009);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-09 (2012).
114. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-6 (LexisNexis 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-504
(2012); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 4-8 (West 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3203(6)
(2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:17 (2007) (Louisiana's defense predates the MODEL
PENAL CODE); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103 (2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:3
(LexisNexis 2007); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.03 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
2-304 (LexisNexis 2008).
115. IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.6 (West 2003).
116. See Ostrosky v. State, 704 P.2d 786, 792 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); State v.
Tyszkiewicz, 104 P.3d 188, 191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Miller v. Commonwealth, 492
S.E.2d 482, 486-87 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)); People v. Chacon, 150 P.3d 755, 761-62 (Cal.
2007); Kipp v. State, 704 A.2d 839, 842-43 (Del. 1998); Grisson v. State, 515 S.E.2d 857,
859-60 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); Meadows v. State, No. 38A01-0906-CR-282, 2009 WL
3486233, at *2-3 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2009) (unpublished memorandum decision);
Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 619 (Mass. 1993); People v. Woods, 616
N.W.2d 211, 217-18 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); Plocher v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 681 N.W.2d
698, 705 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Edwards, 837 N.W.2d 81, 89 (Neb. 2013); State v.
Kremlacek, No. A-98-1195, 1999 WL 759970, at *3-4 (Neb. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1999); State
v. Haddenham, 793 P.2d 279, 286 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (dicta implying availability of the
defense); State v. Pope, - N.C. App. -, -, 713 S.E.2d 537, 541-42 (2011); State v.
Howell, No. 97CA824, 1998 WL 807800, at *11-12 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1998); State v.
Hays, 964 P.2d 1042, 1045-46 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (implying that mistake of law might be a
valid defense if the law in question was found to be ambiguous and did not allow the
offender to know what conduct is permissible); Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 764 A.2d 20,
37-39 (Pa. 2001) (declining to allow the defense in these circumstances but recognizing its
existence under the Due Process Clause); State v. Berberian, 427 A.2d 1298, 1301 (R.I.
1981); State v. Mosher, 465 A.2d 261, 265-66 (Vt. 1983); Miller v. Commonwealth, 492
S.E.2d 482, 486-88 (Va. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Leavitt, 27 P.3d 622, 627-28 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2001); State v. Reitter, 595 N.W.2d 646, 659-60 (Wis. 1999).
117. Bsharah v. United States, 646 A.2d 993, 1000-01 (D.C. 1994).
118. They are: Florida, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, but see
Ethics Comm'n v. Keating, 1998 OK 36, 1 27, 958 P.2d 1250, 1275 (Opala J., dissenting)
(citing Raley and Cox and suggesting that the defense should be available for state-
sanctioned behavior), South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia.
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Code are more restrictive,"' except for a New Jersey statute that
allows a limited defense of personal mistake of law.120
Two states seem not to recognize the mistake of law defense. An
Arizona statute provides: "Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of law
does not relieve a person of criminal responsibility."21 The Arizona
Court of Appeals recently explained that "[i]n jurisdictions that
recognize it, entrapment by estoppel is a defense to a crime . . . "
implying that recognition was not mandatory or required by law,'22
although the Arizona Court of Appeals seemed to recognize the
defense in dicta in an earlier case.123 A Wyoming judicial decision
held that mistake of law is no defense.124
In 1955 when it was created, section 2.04 served a useful purpose.
It took a position on a contested question of criminal law upon which
the states were divided and offered a clear and reasoned position to
any state adopting it. However, after the constitutional defense was
recognized and elaborated beginning in 1959, the Model Penal Code
defense became potentially problematic, particularly when the Code
made no effort to explain the relationship between the statute and
due process principles or explain the scope of the statute in light of
the Supreme Court decisions. The Model Penal Code suggested that
the definition and scope of the defense was a question of legislative or
judicial policy rather than application of the federal Constitution. But
states are not free to offer less protection than is required by the
119. See infra Part II.
120. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-4(c)(3) (West 2005) (allowing defense where "[tJhe actor
otherwise diligently pursues all means available to ascertain the meaning and application
of the offense to his conduct and honestly and in good faith concludes his conduct is not an
offense in circumstances in which a law-abiding and prudent person would also so
conclude").
121. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-204(B) (2010).
122. State v. Kosatschenko, No. 2 CA-CR 2010-0116, 2010 WL 4888037, at *1 (Ariz.
Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2010) (noting that "entrapment by estoppel is not a statutorily
recognized defense in Arizona, nor has it been created or recognized by common law").
123. State v. Tyszkiewicz, 104 P.3d 188, 191 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
124. Harris v. State, 2006 WY 76, 28, 137 P.3d 124, 131 (Wyo. 2006). In Harris, the
defendant previously had been convicted of two felonies. Id. 31, 137 P.3d at 27. After his
convictions, he wanted to purchase a firearm. Id. A deputy sheriff and a store employee
informed him that he could legally purchase a muzzle-loading black powder rifle. Id. He
was subsequently arrested for owning the muzzle-loader. Id. At trial, the defendant
wanted to argue mistake of law and mistake of fact. Id. 11 23-24, 137 P.3d at 130. Without
citing Raley or Cox, the court held that "[tihe fact that [defendant] took steps to inquire
whether he was allowed to possess the rifle is simply irrelevant. '[A] good faith or
mistaken belief that one's conduct is legal does not relieve a person of criminal liability for
engaging in proscribed conduct.' " Id. 1 27, 137 P.3d at 131 (quoting 21 Am. JUR. 2D
Criminal Law § 137 (1998), but attributing the quote to § 153).
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federal Constitution.'2 5 Accordingly, the Model Penal Code laid the
groundwork for confusion. As is explained in Part II, that confusion
was realized.
II. DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE MODEL PENAL CODE DEFENSE
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE
In five distinct ways, state statutes or court decisions deny the
defense under circumstances where courts following the principles
established by the Supreme Court would grant a defense. However,
there appear to be no circumstances in which the Model Penal Code
or a statute based on it would grant a defense when the Constitution
would not. This raises the question of what function or purpose the
Model Penal Code-based statutes serve.
The first way some state courts go below the federal floor is by
denying the defense entirely.'26 Second, some states diverge from the
constitutional cases by allowing reliance only on written statements of
government officials.'2 7 Third, at least one state holds that the defense
is inapplicable to strict liability crimes, even though courts applying
the constitutional defense recognize that it is potentially applicable to
all offenses.'28 Fourth, some states limit the defense to actions taken
in reliance on statements from specified government actors.'29 Fifth,
some states require that the government official have actual authority
to interpret the law.
A. Jurisdictions Categorically Denying the Defense
Arizona'"' and Wyoming,'32 both Model Penal Code states, seem
to deny the defense entirely. None of the cases rejecting or
questioning the defense address Raley, Cox, or their progeny, and
125. But see Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501, 502-
03 (2008) (noting that while state courts may not reject binding Supreme Court precedent,
states have attempted to do so in certain cases); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright,
Leaky Floors: State Law Below Constitutional Limits, 50 ARiZ. L. REV. 227, 228-30 (2008)
(demonstrating that state courts have, at times, offered less protection than required by
the Supreme Court, even though many believe that the federal Constitution and Supreme
Court set a minimum "floor" that states must reach).
126. See infra Part II.A.
127. See infra Part II. B.
128. See infra Part II.C.
129. See infra Part II.D.
130. See infra Part II.E.
131. See supra notes 121-23.
132. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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therefore there is no explanation as to how or why the constitutional
defense can be disregarded.
Wyoming determined that mistake of law was no defense in
Harris v. State,' where a sheriff's deputy mistakenly told the
defendant, a convicted felon, that he could own a muzzle-loading
rifle." The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected his "mistake of law"
defense because "[t]he fact that Mr. Harris took steps to inquire
whether he was allowed to possess the rifle is simply irrelevant." 3 5
Neither the court nor the parties' briefs mentioned Raley, Cox, or
their progeny."' Had the court applied the constitutional mistake of
law defense, the defendant might well have been acquitted.
The Virginia case of Miller v. Commonwealth3 involved
virtually identical facts; the defendant, a convicted felon, was
informed by his probation officer and other government officials that
he could own a muzzle-loading rifle.' The Virginia Court of Appeals
reversed his conviction, because, applying the constitutional defense,
the court concluded that "Miller's reliance on the advice of his
probation officer was reasonable and in good faith."" Thus, applying
the federal Constitution, Virginia granted the defense in precisely the
same circumstances in which Wyoming denied it.
Outright rejection of the constitutional defense is
unconstitutional. In rejecting a claim by the U.S. Department of
Justice that federal law did not recognize the defense, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, whose territorial jurisdiction
includes Wyoming, was right when it explained that "not accept[ing]
the entrapment by estoppel defense ... is incorrect and, in fact,
cannot be correct in light of Supreme Court precedent."" Because
the court recognized that "where an agent of the government
affirmatively misleads a party as to the state of the law and that party
proceeds to act on the misrepresentation. . . criminal prosecution of
the actor implicates due process concerns under the Fifth and
133. 2006 WY 76, 137 P.3d 124 (Wyo. 2006).
134. Id. 1 4, 27, 137 P.3d at 127, 131.
135. Id. 27, 137 P.3d at 131.
136. See generally id. (not citing Raley or Cox); Brief of Appellant, Harris, 2006 WY
76, 137 P.3d 124 (Wyo. 2006) (No. 05-29), 2005 WL 4781262 (not citing Raley or Cox);
Brief of Appellee, Harris, 2006 WY 76, 137 P.3d 124 (Wyo. 2006) (No. 05-29), 2005 WL
4781263 (not citing Raley or Cox).
137. 492 S.E.2d 482 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
138. Id. at 484.
139. Id. at 491.
140. United States v. Nichols, 21 F.3d 1016, 1018 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994).
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Fourteenth amendments."l 4 ' As the Nebraska Supreme Court held, in
deciding a previously unresolved question, "[g]iven the constitutional
roots of the entrapment by estoppel defense, we conclude that it
should be recognized in this state." 4 2 It is difficult to see how any
court reading these cases could come to a contrary conclusion.
B. Jurisdictions Restricting the Defense to Written Statements
Statutes in Colorado,'4 3 New Hampshire,'" Texas,'45 and Utah'"
allow the defense only when the government official's statements are
written, presumably to avoid allowing the defense when the advice
was not in fact given.147 Statutes requiring a writing cannot faithfully
reflect the constitutional defense. While Laub and PICCO involved
written advice, the Court reversed convictions based on oral advice in
Raley and Cox.'" If states were free to deceive-defendants so long as
they did so orally, the convictions in Raley and Cox should have been
affirmed.
Nevertheless, state courts have denied the defense based on oral
advice when a statute required that the advice be in writing. A pair of
Utah cases underscores the consequences of defendants invoking the
Constitution rather than a statute alone. In State v. Norton,49 the
Utah Court of Appeals denied a defense resting on oral advice
instead of the "written interpretation of the law contained in an
141. Id. at 1018 (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 568-71 (1965)); see also Raley v.
Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-39 (1959); United States v. Billue, 994 F.2d 1562, 1568 (11th Cir.
1993); United States v. Clark, 986 F.2d 65, 69 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Tallmadge,
829 F.2d 767, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1987).
142. State v. Edwards, 837 N.W.2d 81,89 (Neb. 2013).
143. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-504 (2012). But see Turney v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 222
P.3d 343,348 (Colo. App. 2009) (citing PICCO and Raley).
144. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626:3(II) (LexisNexis 2007).
145. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.03(b) (West 2011); see Bonilla v. State, No. 14-08-
00289-CR, 2010 WL 2195440, at *9 (Tex. Crim. App. June 3, 2010); Austin v. State, 541
S.W.2d 162, 166-67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
146. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-304(2) (LexisNexis 2008).
147. Yet, the statutes provide no exception for cases in which the government admits
to offering the advice.
148. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 570 (1965) (oral statements by the chief of police);
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1959) (oral statements issued by a legislative
commission); see, e.g., United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1995) (oral
statements by a drug enforcement agent); United States v. Thompson, 25 F.3d 1558, 1565
(11th Cir. 1994) (oral statements by law enforcement officers); United States v. Hedges,
912 F.2d 1397, 1404, 1406 (11th Cir. 1990) (oral statement by a U.S. Air Force officer);
United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 775 (9th Cir. 1987) (oral advice of a federally
licensed firearms dealer).
149. State v. Norton, 2003 UT App 88,67 P.3d 1050.
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opinion of a court of record" required by the Utah version of the
Model Penal Code.' Defendant Norton, a bail bondsman, claimed to
rely on the oral advice of a deputy county attorney that he could
arrest a bailee who failed to pay his bond;'"' Norton was subsequently
charged with kidnapping.'52 The trial court precluded Norton's
defense because the advice was not written, and the court of appeals
affirmed.' The court did not discuss Raley or its progeny.
150. Id. 15, 67 P.3d at 1053 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-304(2)(b)(ii)
(LexisNexis 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Utah's version of the Model Penal
Code provides:
Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law is no
defense to a crime unless:
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his conduct did
not constitute an offense, and
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable reliance upon:
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of
permission by an administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for
interpreting the law in question; or
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of record
or made by a public servant charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the
law in question.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-304(2)(a)-(b) (LexisNexis 1999).
151. Norton, 2003 UT App 88, 1 4,14,67 P.3d at 1051, 1053.
152. Id. J 7, 67 P.3d at 1052.
153. Id. J 13, 67 P.3d at 1053 ("Because Defendant did not rely on a written
interpretation of the law, the trial court did not err when it held that the defense was
inapplicable."). Texas reached a similar conclusion in Linder v. State, 734 S.W.2d 168, 171
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Like Norton, the defendant in Linder was a bail bondsman who
had been arrested for kidnapping a principal obligor on a bond who failed to appear in
court. Id at 169. The defendant had established that the local District Attorney told him
that him that he could arrest bond jumpers. Id. at 171. But his defense was precluded
because "no evidence of a written document as required by article 8.03 of the Penal Code
was introduced, only that oral permission had been granted." Id. Texas's version of the
Model Penal Code provides that:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that the actor reasonably believed the
conduct charged did not constitute a crime and that he acted in reasonable
reliance upon:
(1) an official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant of
permission by an administrative agency charged by law with responsibility for
interpreting the law in question; or
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Another Utah case, however, allowed the defense based on oral
advice, where the defense did not invoke the statute, but instead
invoked the Constitution itself. In South Salt Lake City v.
Terkelson,'54 the Utah Court of Appeals allowed the defense based on
oral advice. The defendants operated a sexually oriented business in a
city with an ordinance prohibiting employees of such businesses from
touching or being touched by patrons.' 5 The defendants and the city
had discussed the ordinance and reached an understanding about its
scope, but the city unilaterally and without notice reinterpreted the
law and charged the defendants with violating it.156 Relying on Raley,
Cox, and PICCO, the court held that the defendants were entitled to
present the constitutional defense.' The court remanded the
conviction and instructed the trial court to consider
the identity and authority of the person who informed
Defendants regarding the scope and reach of the ordinance, the
specificity of such information, how such information was
transmitted, whether the City notified Defendants of its intent
to change its interpretation and enforcement of the ordinance,
and the reasonableness of Defendants' reliance, if any.'
The court in Terkelson neither cited Utah's mistake of law
statute nor required that the government official's statements be in
writing. Instead, the decision required the trial court to make a
determination of reasonable reliance based on all the
circumstances.' 59
Based on the rationale of Terkelson, the defendant in Norton
would have been acquitted if he had raised the constitutional defense
instead of the statutory defense and if his reliance was found to be
reasonable. Interestingly, one judge of the Utah Court of Appeals,
Gregory Orme, joined the opinion in both Norton and Terkelson.
(2) a written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court of record
or made by a public official charged by law with responsibility for interpreting the
law in question.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.03(b)(1)-(2) (West 2011).
154. South Salt Lake City v. Terkelson, 2002 UT App 405, 61 P.3d 282.
155. Id. 1 2, 61 P.3d at 283.
156. Id. 1 3, 61 P.3d at 283.
157. Id. 11 12-16, 61 P.3d at 285-86 (citing United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp.,
411 U.S. 655 (1973); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423
(1959)).
158. Id. 1 16, 61 P.3d at 286.
159. Id.
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C. Jurisdictions Denying the Defense for Strict Liability Crimes
The North Dakota Supreme Court denies the mistake of law
defense for strict liability crimes." North Dakota has a mistake of
law statute similar to the Model Penal Code.161 In State v. Fridley,162
the defendant was prosecuted for driving with a suspended license, a
strict liability offense.'16 He was precluded from showing at trial that a
State Highway Department employee incorrectly told him that his
license would not be suspended until he sent in a work-permit
request.'"
The North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that the state's
mistake of law statute "is an almost complete adoption of Chapter 6
of the Proposed [Federal Criminal] Code dealing with defenses
involving justification and excuse."6  The proposed code states "[tihis
section sets forth those circumstances under which a person is
excused from criminal liability for his conduct because he mistakenly
believed his conduct did not constitute a crime. The defense is not
available for infractions where proof of culpability is generally not
required."166
Based on its understanding of the proposed code, the court held
"[it was] evident that, in this regard, the draftsmen intended the
applicability of the mistake of law defense to turn on the presence of
a culpability requirement within the statute, rather than the
probability of confinement."' 7 The court concluded: "[A]llowing the
assertion of the mistake of law defense, which rests upon a
defendant's 'good faith belief' that his conduct does not constitute a
crime, is difficult to reconcile with the concept of a strict liability
160. See State v. Fridley, 335 N.W.2d 785, 789 (N.D. 1983); see also State v. Kleppe,
2011 ND 141, 1 25, 800 N.W.2d 311, 318; State v. Buchholz, 2006 ND 227, 112, 723
N.W.2d 534, 538; State v. Egan, 1999 ND 59, 1 17, 591 N.W.2d 150, 154; State v. Eldred,
1997 ND 112,1 31, 564 N.W.2d 283, 290-91.
161. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-09 (2012); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 (1962).
162. 335 N.W.2d 785 (N.D. 1983).
163. Id. at 787-88.
164. Id. at 788.
165. Id. at 788 (quoting State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 814 (N.D. 1983))
(alteration in original). The Proposed Federal Criminal Code was influenced by the Model
Penal Code. NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT: A
PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, at xi (1971). However, the Model Penal
Code generally does not have strict liability offenses. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1)
(1962). Accordingly, the question of the applicability of mistake of law to strict liability
offenses did not arise.
166. Fridley, 335 N.W.2d at 789.
167. Id.
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offense for which proof of a culpable state of mind is not required."'
North Dakota courts have since refused to allow the defense for strict
liability offenses. 6 1 It is odd, to say the least, that the North Dakota
Supreme Court gave dispositive weight to commentary on an un-
enacted draft model code, while devoting not a single word to binding
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, such as Raley and its progeny.7 0
Other state and federal courts do not limit the constitutional
defense to particular crimes or categories of crimes"' and hold that
"[blecause the defense . . . 'rests upon principles of fairness ... it may
168. Id. at 789. The court here is mistaken. The point is that the defense is unavailable
unless the belief is actually held, i.e., held in good faith. United States v. Shafer, 625 F.3d
629, 638 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding the defense is unavailable if the defendant is not misled).
It is perfectly consistent to have a good-faith belief that conduct is not criminal, even if the
conduct constitutes a strict liability offense. For example, if the state highway agency were
to post signs indicating that the speed limit was 65 miles per hour when by state statute it
was 55, motorists might well be able to claim in good faith that they believed it was legal to
drive at 64.9 miles per hour, even if speeding were a strict liability offense.
169. See State v. Kleppe, 2011 ND 141, 1 25, 800 N.W.2d 311, 318; State v. Buchholz,
2006 ND 227,112,723 N.W.2d 534, 538; State v. Egan, 1999 ND 59, 1 17, 21, 591 N.W.2d
150, 154; State v. Eldred, 1997 ND 112, 1 31, 564 N.W.2d 283,290-91.
170. It is particularly difficult to understand the court's decision not to address the
constitutional law because the court knew about the cases. In Olson v. City of West Fargo,
the court quoted with approval a Fifth Circuit case analyzing Raley and Cox, using it to
hold that an adult-licensing statute was not unconstitutionally vague, because "[tihere is
little doubt that patterns of enforcement and tacit understandings will develop to the point
where all involved will not question the reach of the ordinance." 305 N.W.2d 821, 829
(N.D. 1981) (citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 830-31
(5th Cir. 1979)). Olson was implicitly decided on the basis that actions of government
officials could create legally binding expectations. Yet, neither Olson nor Raley and Cox
were addressed in Fridley or subsequent cases.
171. United States v. George, 386 F.3d 383, 400 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Dixon,
No. 97-6088, 1999 WL 98578, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 1999) (citing Connelly, supra note 4,
at 641) (unpublished opinion); United States v. Brebner, 951 F.2d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir.
1991). State cases also apply it to a variety of offenses. Kipp v. State, 704 A.2d 839, 843-44
(Del. 1998) (unlawful possession of a firearm); State v. Guzman, 968 P.2d 194, 210 (Haw.
Ct. App. 1998) (public protest); Walker v. Commonwealth, 127 S.W.3d 596, 608-09 (Ky.
2004) (false arrest by bail bondsman); Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 619
(Mass. 1993) (involuntary manslaughter); People v. Woods, 616 N.W.2d 211, 211, 217-18
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (election crimes); Whitten v. State, 690 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2005) (unlawful firearm possession); State v. Cooper, No. A03-1685, 2004 WL
2283431, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2004) (speeding on a snowmobile); State v.
Sheedy, 480 A.2d 887, 889 (N.H. 1984) (unlawful interception of telephone conversations);
State v. Grammenos, No. 5705, 2006 WL 2057191, at *9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 26,
2006) (driving "go-peds" without a license); State v. Berberian, 427 A.2d 1298, 1301 (R.I.
1981) (obscenity law); State v. Mosher, 465 A.2d 261, 265-66 (Vt. 1983) (denying use of
post-Miranda silence against defendant); Miller v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 482, 484-88
(Va. Ct. App. 1997) (unlawful firearm possession); State v. Leavitt, 27 P.3d 622, 627
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (unlawful firearm possession). Nevertheless, the nature of the
crime will often be a relevant factor in determining whether the reliance was reasonable.
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be raised even in strict liability offense cases.' "172 This is correct as a
matter of precedent and as a matter of criminal law doctrine.
As a matter of precedent, the general rule is correct and the
North Dakota rule is not because the Supreme Court applied the
doctrine to what was apparently a strict liability offense in PICCO.
The Third Circuit opinion, which the Supreme Court in this respect
affirmed, rejected the government's argument that any mistake was
irrelevant because the statute required no scienter.17 3 In addition,
lower courts had interpreted the statute at issue as imposing strict
liability."' The Third Circuit recognized that the question of whether
the statute required scienter had been left open in an earlier Supreme
Court decision,"' but it found that the defense it recognized was
available whether or not scienter was required."' Because the Court
172. United States v. Sistrunk, 622 F.3d.1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2010); Poppell v. City of
San Diego, 149 F.3d 951, 960 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Thompson, 25 F.3d 1558,
1564 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1405 (11th Cir.
1990) (citing United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 1987))); United States
v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 714 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397,
1405 (11th Cir. 1990)); United States v. Brady, 710 F. Supp. 290, 296 (D. Colo. 1989); State
v. Guzman, 968 P.2d 194, 208 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998); see also People v. Stephens, 937
N.Y.S.2d 822, 824-25 (N.Y. App. Term 2011) (considering the defense in a prosecution for
a strict liability offense); People v. Meldman, No. 276245, 2008 WL 3540218, *4 (Mich.
App. 2008) (considering the defense in a prosecution for a strict liability offense); cf. 21
AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 136 (2008) ("[Blecause the defense of 'entrapment by
estoppel,' . . . rests upon principles of fairness, it may be raised even in strict liability
cases."); 53 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 9 (1999) ("Because motive or intent is generally
irrelevant with respect to strict liability offenses, prosecutors have argued entrapment by
estoppel is not available to defendants charged with strict liability crimes, but this
argument has been universally rejected.").
173. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 461 F.2d 468, 478 (3d Cir. 1972) ("It is
the position of the Government, on the other hand, that the statute does not require a
showing of scienter-criminal intent . . . ."), affd in pertinent part, 411 U.S. 655, 674-75
(1973).
174. As the First Circuit explained:
In the seventy-five years since enactment [of the statute at issue in PICCO], no
court to our knowledge has held that there must be proof of scienter; to the
contrary, the Refuse Act has commonly been termed a strict liability statute. See
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1970),
affd, 482 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909, 94 S. Ct. 229, 38 L. Ed. 2d
147 (1973); United States v. Interlake Steel Corp., 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619, 622 (1st Cir. 1974). The Court later cited
White Fuel with approval on this point. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 250
(1980).
175. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 461 F.2d at 478.
176. The court explained:
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did not find it necessary to determine whether the offense was strict
liability, PICCO itself indicates that the question is irrelevant to the
availability of the defense. That is, in PICCO, even though the
proceedings below clearly raised the likelihood that the statute was
one of strict liability, the Supreme Court held the defense was
available.
PICCO's approach makes sense, because the constitutional
defense does not implicate the defendant's mental state. A defendant
may be convicted of a strict liability crime even if she acted with due
care to ensure that her conduct was within the law.'77 Thus, a
defendant may be guilty even if she is unaware that her activity is
illegal or believed her activity is legal, and even if she was unaware of
facts or circumstances making her conduct illegal or believed that
those facts did not exist.178 But the constitutional mistake of law
defense "rests upon principles of fairness rather than the defendant's
mental state and thus it may be raised even in strict liability offense
cases."7 9 The focus is on the conduct of the government official, not
the defendant's mental state.'" It is no fairer to induce an otherwise
innocent person to commit a strict liability crime than it is to induce
him to commit a crime requiring scienter.
North Dakota's approach is also at odds with basic principles of
criminal law, which distinguish between mistakes constituting
defenses even if every element of the offense is proved and mistakes
negating elements of the offense. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor
explained when she was a judge on the Second Circuit, while the
constitutional defense "does not negate any of the statutory elements
of a crime," it grants relief because "even though the government
may have proved all of the elements of a crime, to convict the
defendant for acts committed in reasonable reliance on a government
official's statement would violate due process or fundamental
fairness."' 8' That is, it is irrelevant that strict liability offenses do not
PICCO does not claim that it did not know the law existed. Its proofs showed that
it was well aware of section 407. Rather, PICCO asserts that it was affirmatively
misled by the Corps of Engineers to believe that the Act would be inapplicable to
discharges of waste that did not impede navigation. Thus the assertion is not that
PICCO was ignorant of the law's application to it and therefore lacked scienter.
Id.
177. See 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 23 (15th ed. 2009).
178. Id.
179. United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1405 (11th Cir. 1990).
180. Id.
181. United States v. George, 386 F.3d 383, 399 (2d Cir. 2004).
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require scienter because the mistake of law defense does not operate
to negate scienter. The defense operates primarily when all elements,
including scienter or not, are proven. Take, for example, a crime like
possession of a controlled substance, which generally requires
knowing the nature of the object possessed and therefore is not a
strict liability offense. If, say, a state Assistant Attorney General
erroneously informed an Emergency Medical Technician that she was
authorized by statute to possess a controlled substance in connection
with her duties, that advice would not negate the relevant mens rea:
the defendant would still know that she possessed a controlled
substance, satisfying every element of the offense. The mistake does
not negate scienter or any other element, yet, a conviction would still
be unfair.
If negation of mens rea were the key function of the mistake of
law doctrine, then it would apply only to the relatively rare crimes
that themselves require knowledge of illegality. It would also be
entirely redundant of the statutorily required element. The statute
makes sense only if it operates in some cases not covered by the
independently applicable legal principle that if a statute requires
knowledge of the law as an element, a mistake about that law means
that the defendant is not guilty. Therefore, North Dakota's approach
is incorrect as a matter of criminal law doctrine as well as inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent.
Indeed, a defendant's reliance must be reasonable, and it is
generally more reasonable to rely on advice about a technical
regulatory regime than on advice that it is legal to commit a
traditional, non-strict-liability offense, like rape, robbery, or burglary.
For this reason, Professor Dru Stevenson reasonably concludes that
"[r]ules on the strict liability end of the continuum are the ones most
likely to give rise to an entrapment by estoppel defense.""'
D. Jurisdictions Requiring an Opinion from Specified Officers
Several jurisdictions deny the defense unless the advice is given
by a specified officer or agency. Ultimately, these limitations are in
irreconcilable tension with the Supreme Court cases.
The Tenth Circuit holds the unique view that courts are not
government agencies or officials, and therefore courts as a class
cannot make statements giving rise to entrapment by estoppel
182. Dru Stevenson, Entrapment by Numbers, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 63
(2005).
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defenses: "[aiccordingly, any allegation that a court, as an entity,
issued a decision inducing [the defendant] to take a particular action
is not one upon which an estoppel claim may stand."1 3 Alabama,'"
Illinois,'" Missouri," and Montana' allow the defense based only on
appellate judicial decisions. Texas'88 and Utah 89 require written
opinions of a court of record. Louisiana limits the defense to "a final
judgment of a competent court of last resort that a provision making
the conduct in question criminal was unconstitutional."'"
Alaska's courts hold that advice from subordinate law
enforcement officers cannot give rise to the defense."' The Alaska
Court of Appeals explained that
[t]he defendant must show that he or she relied on an "official
interpretation" provided by "the public officer or body charged
by law with ... enforcement of the law defining the offense."
We interpret this language to refer to a formal interpretation of
the law issued by the chief enforcement officer or agency; it
does not encompass extemporaneous legal advice or
interpretations given by a subordinate officer.'92
183. United States v. Bader, 678 F.3d 858, 887 (10th Cir. 2012).
184. ALA. CODE § 13A-2-6 (LexisNexis 2005) (limiting it to "an official statement of
the law contained in a statute or the latest judicial decision of the highest state or federal
court which has decided on the matter").
185. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-8 (West 2002).
186. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.031(2)(b) (West 2012) (requiring reliance on an appellate
court opinion).
187. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-103(6)(c) (2011) (requiring reliance on an opinion of
the Montana Supreme Court or a United States appellate court, thereby excluding
reliance on statements by a trial court or an intermediate Montana court of appeal).
188. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.03(b)(2) (West 2011).
189. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-304(2)(b)(ii) (LexisNexis 2008).
190. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:17(2) (2007); see also State v. Striggles, 210 N.W. 137,
138 (Iowa 1926) (allowing reliance on the judgments of the highest court in a jurisdiction,
but disallowing reliance on the decisions of any inferior courts).
191. Haggren v. State, 829 P.2d 842, 844 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992), overruled on other
grounds, Allen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 168 P.3d 890 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007).
192. Id. at 844; see also Stevens v. State, 135 P.3d 688, 695 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006)
(holding that "the mistake of law defense is not available to people who rely (even
reasonably) on a mistaken statement or interpretation of the law received from a police
officer or other subordinate officer"); Morgan v. State, 943 P.2d 1208, 1212 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that the defense was not available when a "probation officer failed to
inform [the defendant] of the law governing his conduct").
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At the same time, Alaska law requires citizens to obey a peace
officer's instructions in various circumstances, apparently even one of
the lowest rank.193
Treating mistake of law as a policy question unconstrained by the
Constitution, as the Model Penal Code does, could reasonably lead to
a variety of approaches. One conceivable line of division is between
regulators and enforcers. Perhaps only law enforcement officials, not
day-to-day government administrators, should be allowed to give
advice about what conduct is permissible. Thus, in People v.
Bradley,9 4 the California Court of Appeals found the defense
"inapplicable here because [the City Manager and Assistant City
Manager], even if they provided authorization to [defendant
government officials] for certain expenditures, had no power to
enforce or prosecute the criminal laws of this state."" This makes
sense to a degree; after all, law enforcement officers are the ones who
make decisions that defendants seek to estop; arguably only law
enforcement officers' statements or opinions should give rise to the
defense.
Perhaps, instead, the priority should be reversed. Perhaps, as the
Georgia Court of Appeals held, because criminal law enforcement
agencies generally have no day-to-day authority over regulatory
matters, only advice from regulators and administrators, who have
substantive responsibility and expertise, should give rise to the
defense. 96
Of course, both principles cannot simultaneously be correct-it
cannot be that neither law enforcement officers nor regulators and
administrators should be able to give reliable advice. Yet, both
principles have been used to deny the defense.
But this sort of line drawing assumes that the contours of the
mistake of law defense are a matter of discretionary choice rather
than application of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme
Court. Taking the Supreme Court's cases as a binding baseline, that
the constitutional defense must be available, at least in situations
193. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.110(a)(3)-(4) (2010) (disorderly conduct includes
disobedience to instructions of peace officers to leave or disperse); id. § 12.25.090 (aid in
making arrest); id. § 28.35.180 (traffic instructions); id. § 28.35.182 (failure to stop).
194. 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
195. Id. at 86.
196. See Grisson v. State, 515 S.E.2d 857, 859-60 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting the
defendant's reliance on a Georgia State Patrol employee because the "person who
allegedly spoke with [the defendant] had no authority to issue or advise on the issuance of
driver's licenses").
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where the Supreme Court has applied it, the defense cannot be
limited to particular officers. The defense was granted in Raley, Laub,
and PICCO based on the advice of legislators and civil regulators, not
law enforcement officials. For this reason, California's Bradley
decision requiring advice from a prosecutor was necessarily mistaken;
the Supreme Court recognized the possibility of the defense in
situations when California categorically denies it. On the other hand,
Cox granted the defense based on statements of a law enforcement
officer, so the defense also cannot be limited to those with civil
regulatory or administrative authority; if the Supreme Court is right,
then the decision of the Georgia court must be wrong.
Similarly, Alaska's approach is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court cases given that the defendants in Cox and Raley were allowed
to rely not on the chief law enforcement officers of Ohio and
Louisiana, but on a mere legislative committee chair in Raley, and on
a local sheriff and police chief in Cox. A local sheriff or police chief
has institutional authority over her subordinates, but with regard to
her power over citizens, she has no more authority to enforce the law
or prevent disorder than any other peace officer.' The sheriff in Cox
was not acting as a regulator or issuer of parade permits, but as a
protector of public safety like any other cop. And the opinion, clearly
not in compliance with Alaska's requirement of a "formal
interpretation,"'98 was quite casual, a simple instruction of where to
protest. Yet the Court found it sufficient to trigger the defense.
Similarly, the commission chair in Raley was not the highest
legislative or law enforcement official in the state. One might respond
that the sheriff and committee chair were in charge because at that
time and place there were no higher officials. Therefore, it was
natural to rely on them. But the same is true of a person who follows
the advice or orders of an ordinary cop on the beat, who is in charge
where he is.'" Accordingly, this cannot be a sufficient distinction.
The limitations of Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, Texas,
and Utah to specified judges, and the Tenth Circuit's exclusion of
judges entirely, are equally dubious. The Supreme Court has never
197. "A general deputy or under-sheriff is one who, by virtue of appointment, has the
authority to execute all the ordinary duties of the sheriff, and who executes process
without special power from the sheriff." 80 C.J.S. Sheriffs and Constables § 31 (2010).
198. Haggren v. State, 829 P.2d 842, 844 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
199. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1503 (2001) (requiring obedience to "any lawful order
or direction of any police officer or fireman invested by law with authority to direct,
control or regulate traffic"); Chicago v. Weiss, 281 N.E.2d 310, 315 (lll. 1972) (upholding
ordinance requiring obedience to orders of peace officer).
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applied the constitutional defense based on the statement of a trial
court judge, although other courts have. 200 Not surprisingly, though,
the Supreme Court's decisions make clear that trial court judges are
state actors.20' In Douglas v. Buder,2 " the Court held that a ruling of a
trial judge violated due process when it resulted in incarceration
based on conduct that the defendant had reason to believe was lawful
based on existing law. 20 If the rule, as articulated by a unanimous
Supreme Court in Laub, is that "we may not convict 'a citizen for
exercising a privilege which the State clearly had told him was
available to him,' "I then it is hard to see why judges in general, or
trial judges in particular, among all government actors, are uniquely
incapable of misleading people subject to their authority.
Two cases from Louisiana illustrate both the broader nature of
the constitutional defense, and the trap for the unwary represented by
restrictive statutory defenses. Model Penal Code section 2.04 is based
in part on Louisiana's statute, which allows the defense in two
situations:
(1) Where the offender reasonably relied on the act of the
legislature in repealing an existing criminal provision, or in
otherwise purporting to make the offender's conduct lawful; or
200. See United States v. Brady, 710 F. Supp. 290, 294-95 (D. Colo. 1989); Whitten v.
State, 690 N.W.2d 561, 565 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Leavitt, 27 P.3d 622, 623-25
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001); see also United States v. Austin, 915 F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 1990)
("We do not have before us the situation where a government official, such as a judge, a
prosecuting attorney, an ATF official, or a probation officer, told a convicted felon that he
or she could lawfully own a rifle."); United States v. Mancuso, 139 F.2d 90, 92 (3d Cir.
1943) ("While it is true that men are, in general, held responsible for violations of the law,
whether they know it or not, we do not think the layman participating in a law suit is
required to know more law than the judge.").
201. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991) (stating that
"beyond all question" a "judge" "is a state actor"); Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 540
(1984) ("Subsequent interpretations of the Civil Rights Acts by this Court acknowledge
Congress' intent to reach unconstitutional actions by all state actors, including judges.").
202. 412 U.S. 430 (1973) (per curiam).
203. Id. at 432 (citing Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964) ("There can
be no doubt that a deprivation of the right of fair warning can result not only from vague
statutory language but also from an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of
narrow and precise statutory language.")).
204. United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 487 (1967) (quoting Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S.
423, 438 (1959)).
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(2) Where the offender reasonably relied on a final judgment of
a competent court of last resort that a provision making the
conduct in question criminal was unconstitutional. 205
In State v. West,206 the defendant was convicted of felony
attempted drug possession.207 After serving his sentence, he received a
letter from the state police and the corrections department explaining
that his full rights of citizenship had been restored.21 The police later
found West in possession of a firearm,' a felony for someone with a
felony conviction. 21 0 The Louisiana Supreme Court had previously
held that "restoration of 'all rights of citizenship' " did not restore the
right to possess firearms. 2 11 The defendant argued that he was misled
by the "Verification of First Offender Pardon" letter.212 Citing only
Louisiana's statute, the court held that the defendant was not entitled
to a "mistake of law" defense because the letter was not an act of the
legislature or a decision of a competent court of last resort.2"
Another Louisiana case, though, allowed the defense under
circumstances when West said it was unavailable. In State v. Chiles,214
the defendant was allowed to present a mistake of law defense based
on the statement of a sheriff.215 Chiles, who owned a second-hand
store, was convicted of violating a statute requiring the filing of a
205. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:17 (2009); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 cmt. 3 at 138-
39 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955).
206. 33,133 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/00); 754 So. 2d 408.
207. Id. at p. 2 n.1; 754 So. 2d at 409 n.1 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:967(A)(1)
(2007)). This was defendant's first conviction. Id. at p. 2; 754 So. 2d at 410. Section 40:967
is part of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law.
208. Id. The letter titled "Verification of First Offender Pardon," stated that the
defendant had been "'fully pardoned of the offense ... and that all rights of citizenship
and franchise had been restored in Louisiana.' " Id. Louisiana automatically pardons
certain first-time felony offenders. LA. CONST. art. 4, §.5(E)(1). The letter did not
explicitly state that the defendant could own firearms. See West, 33,133, p. 1 (La. App. 2
Cir. 3/1/00); 754 So. 2d at 409. The Louisiana court made a passing reference to the
ambiguity of the letter: "The defendant's affirmative defense of mistake of law is based
solely on his interpretation of a letter from a state agency." Id. at p. 5; 754 So. 2d at 411.
Rather the court rejected the defendant's reliance defense because it did not fit one of the
statutory pegs. Id.
209. Id. at p. 1; 754 So. 2d at 409.
210. Id. at p. 3; 754 So. 2d at 410 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.1 (2007)).
211. Id. (citing State v. Amos, 343 So. 2d 166, 168 (La. 1977)).
212. Id. at p. 1; 754 So. 2d at 409.
213. Id. at p. 5; 754 So. 2d at 411 ("T]he letter ... is not (1) an 'act of the legislature'
repealing an existing criminal statute; (2) an 'act of the legislature' otherwise purporting to
make the offender's conduct lawful; or (3) a 'final judgment of a competent court of last
resort' that a provision making the conduct in question criminal was unconstitutional.").
214. 569 So. 2d 45 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
215. Id. at 49-50.
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ledger listing the previous day's purchases. 216 Prior to her arrest, the
local sheriff provided owners with index cards, not a ledger, to be
submitted not daily, but once a week.2 17 Chiles complained about the
system and was told that she could either "comply with the card
procedure or go to jail."218 Chiles began mailing the index cards
several times per week. 2 19 The sheriff requested that she mail the
cards more often, and she began mailing the cards every other day.2 20
After the defendant complained to the county attorney about the
system, the sheriff arrested her for failing to submit a daily ledger.22 1
Citing Raley and PICCO, the court held Chiles was not guilty because
she reasonably relied on the sheriff's instructions.2 22
West and Chiles illustrate the difference between the Model
Penal Code defense and the constitutional defense. Both cases might
well have satisfied the constitutional defense. Yet, the Louisiana court
only allowed the defense in Chiles, the case in which it ignored its
own version of the Model Penal Code and relied only on the
constitutional cases. 223 Although Chiles was decided a decade before
West-the case based on Louisiana's statute-West does not cite
Chiles.
216. Id. at 46. The statute provided:
Every person licensed under the provisions of this Part shall make out and deliver
to the superintendent of police of the city or town or to the sheriff of the parish in
which he is doing business, every day before the hour of twelve o'clock noon, a
legible and correct copy of the entries in the book mentioned in R.S. 37:1864
during the previous day.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1866 (2007). That title further provided:
Any secondhand dealer who violates, neglects, or refuses, to comply with any
provision of this Part, shall, for the first offense, be fined no less than twenty-five
dollars, nor more than one hundred dollars or be imprisoned for not less than ten
days nor more than thirty days, or both.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1869 (1990), amended by 2003 La. Acts 3565.
217. Chiles, 569 So. 2d at 47.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 48.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 49-50 (citing United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 675
(1973); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423,438 (1959)).
223. While it is possible to argue that the letter in State v. West was not an unequivocal
statement that the defendant could own a gun, the court did not decide the case on that
basis, rejecting the defense because it was not based on an act of the legislature or a
decision of a competent court of last resort. 33,133, p. 5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/00); 754 So. 2d
408,411.
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Other cases with virtually identical fact patterns turn on whether
a court applies a restrictive statute or the constitutional defense. For
example, like the defendant in West, the defendant in Whitten v.
State224 was informed, upon discharge from probation in Minnesota,
that "he was 'restored to all civil rights and to full citizenship with full
right to vote and hold office the same as if said conviction had not
taken place.' "225 The district judge mistakenly failed to check a box
on the probation discharge form telling the defendant he could not
own guns for ten years.226 Whereas West denied the defendant's
entrapment by estoppel defense because the advice did not come
from the legislature or a high court,227 Whitten held that "the Due
Process Clause of the Minnesota Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit [the
defendant's] conviction." 228
E. Jurisdictions Requiring Actual Authority
Some jurisdictions allow the defense only if the government
officer has actual authority to interpret or enforce the criminal statute
at issue. The cases applying the constitutional defense are somewhat
inconsistent. On the one hand, most courts require that the
government official who advised the defendant be from the same
sovereign as the prosecuting agency.229 Thus, when the United States
is the prosecuting jurisdiction, the defendant cannot rely on
statements from state officials; 230 when a state is prosecuting, a
defendant must show advice from an officer of that state.23'
224. 690 N.W.2d 561 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
225. Id. at 565.
226. Id.
227. West, 33,133, p. 5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/00); 754 So. 2d at 411 ("[Tihe letter ... is not
(1) an 'act of the legislature' repealing an existing criminal statute; (2) an 'act of the
legislature' otherwise purporting to make the offender's conduct lawful; or (3) a 'final
judgment of a competent court of last resort' that a provision making the conduct in
question criminal was unconstitutional.").
228. Whitten, 690 N.W.2d at 565-66 (quoting Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423,438 (1959)).
229. See United States v. Sousa, 468 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2006) ("A successful
entrapment by estoppel defense generally requires that the misleading statement come
from an official representing the sovereign bringing the prosecution . . . ."); United States
v. Ormsby, 252 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Funches, 135 F.3d 1405, 1407
(11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Clark, 986 F.2d 65, 69 (4th Cir. 1993).
230. United States v. Miles, 748 F.3d 485, 489 (2d Cir. 2014) (stating that state and local
officials cannot bind the federal government); United States v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 466-67
(5th Cir. 1996) (holding that to satisfy the requirements of an entrapment by estoppel
defense to a federal crime, a defendant must show reliance on an official or authorized
agent of the federal government); United States v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318, 320-21 (4th
Cir. 1991) (rejecting the application of an entrapment by estoppel defense when the
[Vol. 93176
2014] MISTAKE OF LAWAND THE MPC 177
If the officer is part of the prosecuting sovereign, courts differ on
whether apparent or actual authority is required. The apparent
authority approach is consistent with the Supreme Court cases.232
First, as Professor Parry has pointed out, in Raley itself,. the Court
emphasized that the legislator who gave the advice "clearly appeared
to be an agent of the state,"233 seemingly finding the relevant standard
to be apparent authority. Similarly, in PICCO, the Corps of
Engineers had no actual authority to authorize conduct in the face of
a Supreme Court decision prohibiting that conduct. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court- held that the mistake of law defense was potentially
available.234
Second, because no officer or agency has the authority to
authorize criminal conduct, the search for actual authority is difficult
to justify. If the officer actually had the power to authorize the
conduct at issue, the defendant would need no defense; he would be
exonerated for the distinct reason that there was no crime and the
conduct was perfectly lawful. That is, if a sheriff granted an invalid
permit to carry a pistol, the defendant might have a mistake of law
defense. If a sheriff grants a permit to carry a pistol that is later
challenged and found to be valid, then the valid permit, not a mistake
of law defense, precludes conviction. In almost every case where the
defendant claimed to rely on the affirmative advice of a state trial judge that he could
possess firearms for hunting). The Ninth Circuit recognizes a limited exception for federal
firearms dealers. United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767, 775 (9th Cir. 1987). Other
circuits generally do not agree. See, e.g., United States. v. Hardridge, 379 F.3d 1188, 1193
(10th Cir. 2004) (holding that "[w]e agree with the majority view. Tallmadge stretches the
holdings of Cox and Raley too far"); United States v. White, Nos. 98-4770, 4771, 4784,
1999 WL 731250, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 20, 1999); United States v. Howell, 37 F.3d 1197,
1206 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a "gun dealer... is a private individual [and] his license
to sell firearms does not transform him into a government official"); United States v.
Billue, 994 F.2d 1562, 1569 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that "a federal license to sell firearms
does not transform private licensees into government officials, thereby creating a potential
entrapment by estoppel defense"); United States v. Austin, 915 F.2d 363, 367 (8th Cir.
1990); see also United States v. Lemieux, 550 F. Supp. 2d 127, 132-33 (D. Me. 2008)
(holding that "the federal firearms dealer in this case was not a federal government official
within the meaning of the entrapment by estoppel defense").
231. Miller v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 482, 490 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) ("The ATF
agent, although arguably charged with such responsibility under federal firearms laws, has
no such duty with respect to Virginia law.").
232. See supra Part I.A.
233. Parry, supra note 4, at 38 (citing Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437 (1959)) ("After
Raley, the defense arguably would apply if a government official with apparent authority
made an affirmative and incorrect representation of law to the defendant."); see also
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 439 (1959) (noting that committee members were "the voice
of the State most presently speaking to the appellants").
234. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 675 (1973).
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defense is available, the officer will have acted outside of her
authority by authorizing something prohibited by law.
Third, if, as the Supreme Court has said, the rationale of the
cases is fairness under due process principles, then apparent authority
is sufficient.' Most people cannot distinguish between government
officials who reasonably appear to have authority but do not and
those who reasonably appear to have authority and in fact do. The
critical question must be whether the officer has sufficient apparent
authority to make reliance reasonable.
The Second Circuit, in an opinion joined by then-Judge Sonia
Sotomayor, has explained why the constitutional defense is available
based on a showing only of apparent authority:
The inappropriateness of government prosecution of conduct
that the government has solicited, and the unfairness to the
defendant are no less when the government official who
communicates with him appears to have authority, but in fact
lacks authority to authorize criminal conduct. Furthermore,
adding to the unfairness of such a requirement, in some
circumstances it would be extraordinarily difficult for an
individual, even one trained in law, to determine whether a
government official who purports to authorize criminal conduct
is in fact empowered by law to grant such authorization.2 36
Just as ordinary people cannot know when facially reasonable
substantive advice of a government actor is incorrect, they cannot
determine when an officer who reasonably appears to have authority
to give advice is actually acting without authorization.2 37 The
235. See Raley, 360 U.S. at 439.
236. United States v. Giffen, 473 F.3d 30, 42 n.12 (2d Cir. 2006). Some courts have
suggested that the government official must have actual authority. See, e.g., United States
v. Gutierrez-Gonzalez, 184 F.3d 1160, 1167-68 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Spires, 79
F.3d 464, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1996). But these statements were made in the context of a
defendant relying on statements of individuals who were not federal officials as a defense
in a federal prosecution. Gutierrez-Gonzalez, 184 F.3d at 1168; Spires, 79 F.3d at 467. At
least when the actor is a federal official, circuits that have considered the issue agree that
only apparent authority is needed. See United States v. Baker, 438 F.3d 749, 755-56 (7th
Cir. 2006); United States v. Austin, 915 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1990) ("It is the authority,
whether apparent or actual, of the government official that is crucial to the entrapment by
estoppel defense."); United States v. Hedges, 912 F.2d 1397, 1405 (11th Cir. 1990).
237. This question often turns on agency law. Actual authority exists when the
government vests a public official with the authority to make statements on its behalf.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006). Apparent authority exists when a
third party would reasonably believe that the government official has the actual authority
to interpret the law. Id. § 2.03.
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Fourth,23 8 Seventh,239 and Eighth 24 Circuits, as well as many state
courts, 2 4 1 explicitly hold that that the constitutional mistake of law
defense may rest on the apparent authority of a government official.
Other courts require a defendant to prove reasonable reliance on the
statement in light of the identity of the government official as an
element of the defense.242 Because actual authority is not listed as an
element and because this element seems to cover the concern about
the official's position, these jurisdictions may not require actual
authority.243
The Model Penal Code, as written and as adopted, seems to
require actual authority. The Model Penal Code defense applies when
a defendant relies on the advice of a government official "charged by
law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration, or
enforcement of the law defining the offense."244 In accordance with
the implication of the Model Penal Code, some courts, including the
Fifth245 and Tenth Circuits, 24 have concluded that only a government
238. United States v. Aquino-Chacon, 109 F.3d 936, 939 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing United
States v. Howell, 37 F.3d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1994)).
239. United States v. Howell, 37 F.3d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1994) ("In essence, it applies
when, acting with actual or apparent authority, a government official affirmatively assures
the defendant that certain conduct is legal and the defendant reasonably believes that
official.") (citing United States v. Austin, 915 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1990)).
240. Austin, 915 F.2d at 366 ("It is the authority, whether apparent or actual, of the
government official that is crucial to the entrapment by estoppel defense.").
241. See, e.g., People v. Woods, 616 N.W.2d 211, 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Edwards, 837 N.W.2d 81, 89 (Neb. 2013) ("acting with actual or apparent authority");
State v. Howell, No. 97CA824, 1998 WL 807800, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1988).
242. See United States v. Baker, 438 F.3d 749, 755 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Neville, 82 F.3d 750, 761 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he defendant's reliance [must] be
actual and reasonable in light of the identity of the agent .... ")); United States v. Alba, 38
F. App'x 707, 709 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Eaton, 179 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir.
1999) ("[Sjuch reliance must be objectively reasonable-given the identity of the
official...."); United States v. W. Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 313 (3d Cir. 1997);
People v. Pierce, 725 N.W.2d 691, 694 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a defendant
must show "that the defendant's reliance was reasonable and in good faith given the
identity of the government official, the point of law represented, and the substance of the
official's statements"); Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 764 A.2d 20, 33 (Pa. 2001) ("[Rleliance
must be in good faith and reasonable given the identity of the government official, the
point of law represented, and the substance of the statement."); South Salt Lake City v.
Terkelson, 2002 UT App 405, 11 12-16, 61 P.3d 282, 285-86.
243. See United States v. Theunick, 651 F.3d 578, 589 (6th Cir. 2011) ("Specifically, the
defendant must show that the individual who misled the defendant was an official of the
state; the official actively misled the defendant; and the defendant's reliance was actual
and reasonable.") (citations omitted).
244. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b)(iv) (1962).
245. United States v. Sariles, 645 F.3d 315, 318 n.2 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing United States
v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1996)) ("As a 'narrow exception' to the mistake of
law doctrine, entrapment by estoppel requires a defendant charged with a federal crime to
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official with actual authority can provide an opinion giving rise to a
defense. Presumably, therefore, if a mayor or police chief issues a
pistol permit when the statute assigns that responsibility to a sheriff,
or if a defendant relies on instructions of a uniformed police chief or
sheriff who happens to be outside their county of jurisdiction, then
there is no defense. This makes no sense in the context of a defense
resting on the question of whether a government mistake resulted in
unfairness to an individual.
A pair of court decisions from Colorado illustrates the
consequences of the choice of invoking a narrow statute or broader
principles of constitutional law. Colorado's version of the Model
Penal Code has been held to require actual authority. It provides:
A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct
because he engages in that conduct under a mistaken belief that
it does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense, unless the
conduct is permitted by one or more of the following:
(c) An official written interpretation of the statute or law
relating to the offense, made or issued by a public servant,
agency, or body legally charged or empowered with the
responsibility of administering, enforcing, or interpreting a
statute, ordinance, regulation, order, or law. If such
show the actual authority of a government official to render the advice about federal
law."). However, Spires turned on the fact that the officer involved was a state officer,
"not an authorized federal government agent." Spires, 79 F.3d at 466.
To satisfy the requirements of the defense when charged with a federal crime, a
defendant is required to show reliance either on a federal government official
empowered to render the claimed erroneous advice, or on an authorized agent of
the federal government who has been granted the authority from the federal
government to render such advice.
Id. at 466-67. The court did not require that the officer have actual authority to authorize
the conduct, but only to speak. Id.
246. United States v. Gutierrez-Gonzalez, 184 F.3d 1160, 1167 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[Wie
hold that the defense of entrapment by estoppel requires that the 'government agent' be a
government official or agency responsible for interpreting, administering, or enforcing the
law defining the offense."). However, this holding was in the context of claimed reliance
on a private social service agency. Id. at 1168. An actual authority requirement is difficult
to reconcile with the Tenth Circuit's subsequent holding that the defendant's reliance must
be "reasonable in light of the identity of the agent," which suggests a sliding scale of
apparent authority. See United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1204-05 (10th Cir.
2006).
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interpretation is by judicial decision, it must be binding in the
state of Colorado.247
In People v. Lesslie,2 4 the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction of a deputy sheriff for placing a listening device in the
men's bathroom at a bar249 when the deputy claimed he did so at the
direction of the sheriff.250 The court held that Lesslie could not rely on
the sheriff because the sheriff did not have actual authority to
authorize the use of a listening device.2 5 1 Only a judge, by issuing a
court order, had such actual authority.252 The court did not discuss
Raley or its progeny, making clear that it was applying the statute
alone and not the constitutional principle.
The Lesslie court's interpretation of Colorado's version of the
Model Penal Code is more restrictive than the constitutional defense.
Application of the Constitution should have turned on whether the
defendant reasonably believed that the sheriff had the authority to
issue the order. As a result, Lesslie was deprived of a potentially
meritorious defense. One commentator pointed out the inherent
difficulty in requiring actual authority: "[A]ssuming no public body or
official has authority to grant permission to break the law, it is
difficult to imagine a situation in which a defendant ever could use
CRS [section] 18-1-504(2)(b) as a defense."25 3 By contrast, in Turney
v. Civil Service Commission,25 4 the Colorado Court of Appeals, citing
PICCO, concluded that "affirmative assurances" would be enough to
give rise to the defense, without mentioning that they would have to
be in writing or come from a particular officer, as required by the
statute.
A defendant could reasonably rely on a state building inspector
to tell him how to store building materials; 256 on statements by a trial
247. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-504(2) (2012).
248. 24 P.3d 22 (Colo. App. 2000). See generally Mark S. Cohen, Entrapment by
Estoppel, COLO. LAWYER, Feb. 2002, at 45, 47 (discussing Lesslie).
249. Lesslie, 24 P.3d at 24.
250. Id. at 25.
251. Id. ("[T]he sheriff was not an official authorized or empowered to permit the
interception and recording of communications by such a device.").
252. Id.
253. Cohen, supra note 248, at 47.
254. 222 P.3d 343 (Colo. App. 2009).
255. Id. at 348 (citing United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 673-74
(1973)).
256. State v. Cote, 945 A.2d 412, 429-30 (Conn. 2008).
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court judge;" on a letter from the Department of Corrections
granting a pardon;258 on a statement from the Department of Game
and Inland Fisheries that a hunter with a felony conviction can own a
muzzle-loading rifle;25 9 or a Motor Vehicle Department employee's
statement that a license is valid.2" Yet, in all these cases, state courts
have rejected the defense because the officer making the statement
lacked actual authority.26 1
III. REVISING THE MODEL PENAL CODE TO CONFORM TO THE
CONSTITUTION
U.S. law now has two independent "mutually oblivious
doctrines" 26 2 for dealing with reliance on official misstatements of the
law: the Model Penal Code defense and the constitutional mistake of
law defense. These regimes often lead to different results on the same
facts. Norton and Terkelson in Utah, like West and Chiles in
Louisiana, and to a lesser extent Lesslie and Turney in Colorado,
simply talk past each other. Each court faithfully applied the law it
perceived to be at issue, without acknowledging that another body of
law also applied and, if applied, might well require reaching the
opposite result. As a general matter, courts in states with statutory
mistake of law defenses do not consider federal precedent along with
the statute; the Supreme Court cases are often simply ignored.263 By
257. People v. Knop, 557 N.E.2d 970,974-75 (lil. App. Ct. 1990); State v. V. F. W. Post
No. 3722, 527 P.2d 1020, 1025 (Kan. 1974) (holding that defendants cannot rely on
statements from lower court decisions).
258. State v. West, 33,133, p. 1 (La. App. 2 Cir. 3/1/00); 754 So. 2d 408,409.
259. Miller v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 482,484 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
260. Grisson v. State, 515 S.E.2d 857, 858 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999).
261. E.g., Cote, 945 A.2d at 430 (building inspector); Grisson, 515 S.E.2d at 859-60
(Motor Vehicle Department employee); Knop, 557 N.E.2d at 975 (trial court judge);
V.F.W. Post No. 3722, 527 P.2d at 1025 (trial court judge); West, 33,133, p. 5 (La. App. 2
Cir. 3/1/00); 754 So. 2d at 411 (Department of Corrections officer); Miller, 492 S.E.2d at
490-91 (Department of Game and Inland Fisheries officer).
262. Anthony Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67,67 (1960).
263. As one commentator explained, once states codify "the mistake of law defense,
[their] courts [tend] to analyze mistake of law claims within the framework of the statute.
However, it seems likely that the constitutional defense known as entrapment by estoppel
is broader than the statute." Cohen, supra note 248, at 47. Many of the leading cases
interpreting statutes fail to consider the constitutional cases. See People v. Lesslie, 24 P.3d
22, 25 (Colo. App. 2000); Cote, 945 A.2d at 426-28; Knop, 557 N.E.2d at 974-75; Walker v.
Commonwealth, 127 S.W.3d 596, 608 (Ky. 2004); West, 33,133, p. 5 (La. App. 2 Cir.
3/1/2000); 754 So. 2d at 411; State v. Woods, 984 S.W.2d 201, 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999);
State v. Sheedy, 480 A.2d 887, 888-89 (N.H. 1984); People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068,
1070-72 (N.Y. 1987); State v. Buchholz, 2006 ND 227, 11 16-17, 723 N.W.2d 534, 540;
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contrast, jurisdictions without a mistake of law statute, notably
including federal courts, 2" tend to consider the Supreme Court
cases. 265
In principle, there is nothing problematic with codification and
elaboration of rules required by the Constitution. However,
implementation of constitutional rights in statutes or rules typically
involves expanding those rights or explaining how they apply. For
example, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, establishing
procedures for courts accepting guilty pleas, "provides additional
protections beyond the minimum required by the Constitution." 266
Similarly, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974267 "affords greater protection
to a defendant's right to a speedy trial than is guaranteed by the
[Speedy Trial Clause of the] Sixth Amendment." 268 With Rule 11 (and
its state analogues) and state and federal speedy trial statutes, the
distinct and independent roles of the statute and the Constitution are
clear. The statute offers rights and procedures beyond the protections
of the freestanding Constitution, and therefore defendants,
prosecutors, and judges have reason to use it. Because constitutional
claims in state prosecutions can be vindicated in the U.S. Supreme
Linder v. State, 734 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Norton, 2003 UT App
88, 11 12-15, 67 P.3d 1050, 1053. But see State v. Guzman, 968 P.2d 194, 206-07 & n.18
(Haw. Ct. App. 1998) (considering Supreme Court and federal circuit court entrapment by
estoppel jurisprudence); Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 619 (Mass. 1993)
(noting that "[flederal courts have characterized an affirmative defense of this nature as
'entrapment by estoppel' "); State v. Grammenos, No. 5705, 2006 WL 2057191, at *7-8
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 26, 2006) (noting the "United States Supreme Court cases
that prohibit the State from prosecuting defendants for acts committed pursuant to
permission granted by a government official"); Miller, 492 S.E.2d at 485-86 (discussing the
"trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases" that underlie the entrapment by estoppel
defense); State v. Leavitt, 27 P.3d 622, 626-27. (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on entrapment by estoppel).
264. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
265. See People v. Chacon, 150 P.3d 755, 761 (Cal. 2007); Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 619;
People v. Woods, 616 N.W.2d 211, 216-17 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); Whitten v. State, 690
N.W.2d 561, 565 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 764 A.2d 20, 28-29
(Pa. 2001); Leavitt, 27 P.3d at 626-27. But see Guzman, 968 P.2d at 207 n.18 (discussing
Hawaii's mistake of law statute but deciding that it "does not replace or subsume"
entrapment by estoppel); Grammenos, 2006 WL 2057191, at *8 (deciding that "[allthough
[the] defendant cannot invoke the [New Jersey mistake of law statute], the constitutional
defense is available").
266. Adams v. Peterson, 968 F.2d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (citing Haase v.
United States, 800 F.2d 123, 127 (7th Cir. 1986)).
267. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2012)).
268. United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1497 (9th Cir. 1995).
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Court by certiorari or in lower federal courts on habeas corpus, state
defendants also have reason to rely on the federal Constitution.
There is no advantage to, or function of, a statute offering less
protection than the Constitution in every case269 and no more in any
case. 70 For example, it would be startling to see a recent statute
requiring jury trials when the defendant faces more than five years in
prison, when the Supreme Court has held that juries are required
when defendants face potential incarceration of more than six
months,27 1 and doubly so to see such a statute promulgated by the
ALL. The sole function of such a statute would be to mislead.
Model Penal Code section 2.04(3)(b) and its variants as adopted
in the states can be understood in two ways. One possibility is that the
statutes represent a failed attempt to codify the constitutional
doctrine. That is, perhaps the ALI intended to embody at least the
constitutional minimum but did not achieve that goal. There is little
evidence in the drafting history that this is the case. If that were the
goal, one might expect to see a residual clause acknowledging that the
defense applied in other cases where the Constitution required it.272
Much more likely given the text and the timing of drafting is that
the Model Penal Code was never intended to embody a constitutional
principle and instead created a non-constitutional defense.273 If so,
given that the statutes never offer protection beyond that of the
269. This issue arises only in state court. Because there is no federal statute recognizing
the defense, in federal court it can only be raised as a constitutional claim. In state court,
even when the state statute is substantively equivalent, the statutory defense is inferior to
the constitutional defense because there is no possibility of federal habeas or certiorari
review based on violation of a state statute. See, e.g., Swartz v. Mathes, 291 F. Supp. 2d
861, 872 (N.D. Iowa 2003) ("Because Swartz argued a state-based mistake of law claim
and not a constitutional entrapment by estoppel claim before the state courts, he did not
present his claims as he is required to do if he seeks habeas corpus relief.").
270. New Jersey allows a defense of personal mistake of law that goes beyond the
constitutional defense. But that defense is set out in a separate subsection of the statute
and does not cover official mistakes. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-4 (West 2005).
271. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,159 (1968).
272. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C) (providing an exception to the rape shield
law when "exclusion would violate the defendant's constitutional rights").
273. Cf State v. Guzman, 968 P.2d 194,207 n.18 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998) ("This rationale
also underlies our belief that the affirmative defense contained in [title 702, section 220 of
the Hawaii Statutes], while similar to the due process defense of entrapment by estoppel,
does not replace or subsume the latter defense .... "); State v. Grammenos, No. 5705, 2006
WL 2057191, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 26, 2006) ("This constitutional defense
is similar to the affirmative defense of mistake of law included in [title 2C, section 2-4 of
the New Jersey Statutes]."); Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 764 A.2d 20, 29 (Pa. 2001) ("Some
state legislatures... have enacted statutes providing for a limited defense based upon a
mistake of law in a manner that parallels the reliance doctrine.").
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Constitution but often offer less, they are obsolete in that the
constitutional defense is always preferable.2 74
The Model Penal Code as drafted, adopted, and interpreted,
then, is a trap. It addresses the same problem as a constitutional
doctrine, yet it provides less protection than the Constitution standing
alone. Reliance on such a statute can only disadvantage a defendant.
Therefore, it is always a mistake for defense lawyers to rely on it.
That is, there are, apparently, no cases in which the Model Penal
Code as drafted or adopted offers relief when the freestanding
Constitution does not. In some cases it will be facially obvious that
the constitutional defense is preferable because a specific restriction
in a statute makes the statute certainly or potentially inapplicable or
disadvantageous. In other cases, it is possible that research and
analysis might show that the statute is just as good as the
constitutional defense on any given set of facts that might arise at
trial, and that under no conceivable circumstances will the case be
brought to federal court through certiorari or habeas corpus. But no
competent lawyer should ever do that research or analysis because
the case will be at least as likely to succeed simply by advancing the
constitutional defense. No competent lawyer, that is, should ever
spend public or client funds in a quest to determine whether an
alternative defense that is normally weaker, but might not be in this
case, is just as good as a defense that is already in hand.
A defense attorney, therefore, should always raise the
constitutional defense when it fits the facts of her client's case. The
statutory defense, if raised at all, should be advanced in the
alternative if it applies based on the facts and. the language of the
statute.
Conscientious courts attempting to resolve cases in accordance
with the Constitution should save blundering lawyers from mistakes
induced by the legislature.275 A lawyer pleading the statute should be
274. Professor Parry argues that the common-law version of the defense could be
advantageous by allowing the defense based on apparent authority and when advice was
offered by an official of a separate sovereign. See Parry, supra note 4, at 59-65. While
sensible in principle, this does not amount to a defense of the statutes. Since these statutes
seem to require actual authority, which out-of-jurisdiction officials and officials acting
outside of their areas of responsibility do not have, the statutes themselves stand in the
way of the common-law development he desires.
275. Trial judges have the power and, according to some courts, the duty, to ask
defense counsel if they wish to raise particular defenses presented by the evidence to
ensure "that the theory has not been inadvertently overlooked by counsel." People v.
Sedeno, 518 P.2d 913, 922 n.7 (Cal. 1974) (in bank), overruled in part on other grounds by
People v. Breverman, 960 P.2d 1094 (Cal. 1998); see, e.g., United States v. Delgado-
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deemed by trial and appellate courts to have raised a constitutional
claim, and the defense should be evaluated as a due process question
as well as under the applicable statute.
Ultimately, the problem should be solved by legislatures. There
is nothing wrong in principle with identifying categories of advice or
other situations which establish the defense as a matter of law. States
could use their statutes to make the defense available in a broader
range of circumstances-although they seem to have had little
appetite to do so. But to avoid misleading jurors, lawyers, and people
charged with crimes, every statute should be amended to provide that
the defense is available "in other situations as required by the U.S.
Constitution."
Finally, the ALI should revisit this section of the Model Penal
Code, and make clear that the defense is available at least in all cases
where the Constitution offers a defense. The ALI should consider
whether sound practice, policy, and fairness warrant making the
defense available in some instances even when not required by the
Constitution. But in any event, the text should explain that the
defense must apply "in other situations as required by the U.S.
Constitution."
CONCLUSION
In the mid-1950s, American law recognized two distinct mistake
of law defenses for those who claimed their conduct was lawful after
reasonably relying on official advice. One defense was based on
considerations of public policy and embodied in the Model Penal
Code, the other based on the Constitution. The Model Penal Code
defense is now wholly subsumed within the constitutional defense; the
Model Penal Code never applies when the constitutional defense does
not, but the Supreme Court and other courts have applied the
constitutional defense in circumstances when the Model Penal Code
defense is unavailable. However, many lawyers and judges applying
the Model Penal Code do not recognize or understand this problem.
Accordingly, judges sometimes deny the defense after consideration
Cardenas, 974 F.2d 123, 126 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he supervisory powers of the court
provide the authority to raise sua sponte matters that may affect the rights of criminal
defendants."); United States v. Stewart, 43 C.M.R. 140, 145 (C.M.A. 1971) ("When an
affirmative defense is raised by the evidence, the military judge is required sua sponte to
instruct thereon." (citations omitted)); State v. Berube, 669 A.2d 170, 172 (Me. 1995)
("[O]bvious error results when the court fails to instruct the jury on a statutory defense
generated by the evidence.").
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of only the Model Penal Code defense when relief would have been
available based on the constitutional mistake of law defense.
Treating the mistake of law defense as a pure question of policy
has allowed the states to convict in situations where the Supreme
Court has held defendants are entitled to be acquitted. As a result,
courts and legislatures have "sanction[ed] an indefensible sort of
entrapment by the State-convicting a citizen for exercising a
privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to him."276
Defense lawyers, courts, legislatures, and the ALI should make sure
,that justice is done in cases involving claims of mistake of law by
ensuring that cases are decided under the legal standard required by
the Constitution.
276. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423,426 (1959).
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